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Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank Independence in an Age of Austerity
Abstract
The Federal Reserve (“Fed”) is the central bank of the United States. Because of
its power and importance in guiding the economy, the Fed’s independence from direct
political influence has made it a target of ideologically motivated attacks throughout its
history, with an especially aggressive round of attacks coming in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis and ongoing today. We defend Fed independence. We point to the Fed’s
exemplary performance during and after the 2008 crisis, and we offer the example of a
potential future crisis in which Congress fails to increase the debt ceiling to show how the
Fed’s independence makes it the only entity that can minimize the damage during crises
(both market-driven and policy-induced). We further argue that the Fed’s independence is
justified to prevent self-dealing by politicians, even when no crisis is imminent. Although
the classic justification for Fed independence focuses on the risk that political actors will
keep interest rates lower than appropriate for the long-term health of the economy, we
show that Fed independence addresses the risk of self-dealing and other pathologies even
when, as now, political actors favor tighter monetary policy than appropriate for the longterm health of the economy.
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Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2008 and for much of the deep recession that
followed, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“the Fed”) 1 took
crucial steps to prevent the United States and the global economy from falling into a
depression. Elected officials also acted. The Bush administration quickly devised the
Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”), which Congress first rejected but then
enacted.2 In its first months in office, the Obama administration sought and obtained a
substantial package of spending aimed at stimulating the economy. 3 And building on
efforts begun by President Bush, President Obama rescued the U.S. automobile industry
by arranging for federal government-backed debtor-in-possession financing for General
Motors.4 Yet these efforts were modest in scale relative to those of the Fed.5 Moreover,

1

Congress established the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to serve as the central bank of the United
States. The Fed’s key functions include formulating the country’s monetary policy, maintaining the
stability of the financial system, containing systemic risks, regulating financial institutions, and providing
various financial services to depository financial institutions and to the federal government. The Fed
consists of a central, independent government agency (the Board of Governors), the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Board of Governors and the FOMC
effectuate monetary policy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (LEXIS 2015); FED. RESERVE SYS., ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
FEDERAL
RESERVE
DIRECTORS
11
(2013),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/pdf/roles_responsibilities_FINALweb013013.pdf.
2
The first version of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, debated in the House as H.R. 3997,
was voted down 228-205 on September 29, 2009. See H.R. 3997, 110th Cong. (2008). A second version,
H.R. 1424, passed the Senate on October 1, 2009 and the House 263-171 on October 3, 2009. See H.R.
1424, 110th Cong. (2008) (creating TARP).
3
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (LEXIS 2015).
4
See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE
DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111shrg51964/html/CHRG-111shrg51964.htm; OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
AGENCY
FINANCIAL
REPORT:
FISCAL
YEAR
2009
144-49
(2009),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/Mgt/Documents/09AFR_Treasury_Tagged_07.pdf; PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON AUTOS,
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION NEW PATH TO VIABILITY FOR GM & CHRYSLER 2–3, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Fact_Sheet_GM_Chrysler_FIN.pdf; Brent J. Horton, The
TARP Bailout of GM: A Legal, Historical, and Literary Critique, 14 TEX. REV. L & POL. 217, 249 (2010);
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the American Automotive Industry (Mar. 30, 2009)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-americanautomotive-industry-33009); Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, GM Timeline,
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/GM%20Timeline.pdf;
Secured Superpriority Debtor-in-Possession Agreement among General Motors Corporation, the
Guarantors, and the Lenders (June 3, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/TARP-Programs/automotiveprograms/Documents/GM_Corporation_DIP_Loan_090909_new.pdf.
5
Monetary policy was roughly an order of magnitude larger than fiscal policy. See generally CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
PANEL 162–64 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG112shrg64832.pdf; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,

after opposition led to a stimulus that was too small from the outset,6 politicians of both
parties too quickly set their sights on deficit reduction.7 Tea Party-affiliated congressional
Republicans repeatedly threatened not to raise the debt ceiling—and thus raised the
specter of a first-ever default by the government of the United States—in order to obtain
deep cuts in government spending.8 With the political system thus deploying fiscal policy
at first too timidly and then counterproductively, it was left to the Fed to steer the
economy through recovery via monetary policy.
The Fed answered the call. In the early days of the crisis, the Fed interpreted its
statutory mandate to permit bailouts of key firms,9 and for years thereafter the Fed kept
real interest rates negative to flood the economy with essential liquidity.10
SIG-QR-09-03, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4, 38, 140, 152, 156 (2009), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Franklin Delano Obama?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/opinion/10krugman.html; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Let’s Get Fiscal,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/opinion/17krugman.html; Lawrence
Summers, Op-Ed., Obama’s Stimulus Plan Must Aim for Long-Term Results, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/26/AR2008122601299.html?nav=hcmoduletmv.
7
See Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Testimony Before the Joint
Econ. Comm. (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/testimony-chad-stone-chief-economistbefore-the-joint-economic-committee; Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities,
Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Fin. 9 (Sept. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/_cache/files/d6d7d83d-55c4-47c3-a17bfe26d54e34f8/chad-stone---witness-testimony.pdf; Neil H. Buchanan, Good Deficits: Protecting the Public
Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 VA. TAX REV. 75, 78 (2011); Neil H. Buchanan, Finally, Prominent
Economists are Admitting That the Policy Debate Should not Focus on the Debt and Deficit: The Folly of
Thinking
Too
Far
Ahead,
Verdict,
JUSTICIA.COM,
Jan.
31,
2013,
https://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/31/finally-prominent-economists-are-admitting-that-the-policy-debateshould-not-focus-on-the-debt-and-deficit; Jon Hilsenrath, Course of Economy Hinges on Fight over
Stimulus,
WALL
S T.
J.,
July
26,
2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704720004575376923163437134 (quoting Rep. Paul
Ryan rejecting the supposedly “false premise that only forceful and sustained government intervention in
the economy can secure this country’s renewed prosperity.”); Christina Romer, Now Isn’t the Time to Cut
the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/business/24view.html?_r=0.
8
See Neil H. Buchanan & and Michael C. Dorf, Borrowing By Any Other Name: Why Presidential
“Spending Cuts” Would Still Exceed the Debt Ceiling, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 51 (2014)
[hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Borrowing By Any Other Name]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress
and the President Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 32, 33
(2013) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf,
Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least
Unconstitutional Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 237, 240 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf,
Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose]; Jonathan Weisman,
Republicans Pledge New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/us/politics/gop-pledges-new-standoff-on-debt-limit.html?_r=0
(reporting House Speaker John Boehner’s vow to oppose any increase in the debt ceiling unless it was
offset by spending cuts).
9
José Gabilondo, Financing Hospitals: Defending the Fed’s Role as a Market Maker of Last Resort, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 731, 783–85 (2013); Thomas O. Porter, II, Note & Comment, The Federal Reserve’s
Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483, 485,
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Yet the Fed was not rewarded with anything like universal praise. On the
contrary, in recent years, Fed critics on both the left and the right have issued calls to
“end” or “audit” the Fed.11 The substantive criticisms include the following: The Fed
exercises power in excess of its statutory mandate, as when it created special purpose
vehicles to bail out troubled firms during the early days of the financial crisis;12 it creates
money “out of thin air,” as when it pursued its policy of “quantitative easing” to stimulate
the economy during the deep recession that followed that crisis; 13 by design and in
practice, it favors the interests of banks over the interests of less powerful firms and
individuals; 14 and it tends to over-emphasize its inflation-fighting mandate over its
employment-promoting mandate.15 Although critics on the left and right disagree about
504 (2009); contra Chris Isidore, Why they Let Lehman Die, CNN MONEY, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/companies/why_bear_not_lehman/.
10
See generally Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative Easing, 95 FED.
RESERVE
BANK
S T.
LOUIS
REV.
51
(2013),
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/13/01/Fawley.pdf.
11
See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, S. 209, 113th Cong. (2013); RON PAUL, END THE
FED (2009); MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42079, Federal Reserve: Oversight and
Disclosure Issues 9–10 (2014); Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve: An Analysis of
How the Nation’s Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law in Responding to the Current Financial Crisis,
1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 109, 133 (2010); Julie Hirschfeld & Davis Lisa Lerer, Romney Calls for
Fed Audit
as
Party
Mulls
Platform
Plank,
BLOOMBERG,
Aug.
20,
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/romney-calls-for-fed-audit-as-party-mulls-platformplank.html.
12
See, e.g., Arthur W.S. Duff, Central Bank Independence and Macroprudential Policy: A Critical Look
at the U.S. Financial Stability Framework, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 212 (2014); Emerson, supra note
11, at 129; Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve
and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 236 (2010); but see Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 783–85;
Porter, supra note 9, at 509.
13
See, e.g., John Cochran, Fractional Reserve Banking and Central Banking as Sources of Economic
Instability: The Sound Money Alternative, 11 INDIAN J. OF ECON. & BUS. 543, 544–545 (2012); Timothy C.
Harker, Bailment Ailment: An Analysis of The Legal Status of Ordinary Demand Deposits in the Shadow of
the Financial Crisis of 2008, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 543, 582 (2014) (arguing that the fractional
reserve banking system is premised on the mischaracterization of bank deposits as loans instead of
bailments, resulting in moral hazard and financial instability); Chris Isidore, Gingrich: U.S. Should
Reconsider
the
Gold
Standard,
CNN
MONEY,
Jan.
18,
2012,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/18/news/economy/gingrich_gold_standard/index.htm (promoting the gold
standard).
14
See DONALD KOHN, HUTCHINS CTR. ON FISCAL & MONETARY POLICY AT BROOKINGS, FEDERAL
RESERVE INDEPENDENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SHOULD WE BE WORRIED? (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/01/16-federal-reserve-independencefinancial-crisis-kohn/16-federal-reserve-independence-financial-crisis-kohn.pdf (“The reach and extent of
the lending was unprecedented, and it fostered a perception that Wall Street was being favored over Main
Street.”); Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 792 (same); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance
in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1625
(2009) (“Critics argued . . . that the bill favored the rich[ . . . ]the investment banks, their managers, their
shareholders[ . . . ]at the expense of the taxpayer, while providing no relief to distressed homeowners . . .
.”); but cf. David Wessel, Inside Dr. Bernanke’s E.R., WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204271104574292094147841898 (quoting former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke saying, “I care about Wall Street for one reason and one reason
only: because what happens on Wall Street matters to Main Street.”).
15
See Marc Labonte, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41656, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S MANDATE:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 (2013), http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/misc/R41656.pdf; Gabilondo, supra note 9,
at 749–50; Michelle A. L. Goldberg, Note, The Fed’s Dual Mandate: One Too Many?, 33 REV. BANKING

5

exactly what is wrong with the Fed’s substantive priorities and performance, they offer
similar procedural critiques: the Fed, they complain, is politically unaccountable and
opaque.
Some of the foregoing criticisms are legitimate. 16 Furthermore, if the Fed
deserves praise for its response to the 2008 crisis and its aftermath, it must also share the
blame for creating the crisis in the first place. Although it appropriately maintained low
interest rates to sustain a weak economy during the administration of George W. Bush17 it
failed to provide the necessary oversight of systemically important financial institutions,
which were especially in need of such oversight in a low-interest rate environment.18
Nonetheless, even if some precisely targeted reforms of the Fed can be justified
based on the experience of the recent past, calls to audit or end the Fed are quite
misplaced. Although different in their details, 19 at a minimum such proposals aim to
& FIN. L. 343, 365 (citing former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Charles Schultze warning
that full employment risks inflation); Daniel L. Thornton, The Dual Mandate: Has the Fed Changed Its
Objective?, 94(2) FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 117, 117, 130 (2012), available at
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/12/03/117-134Thornton.pdf; Press Release, Bd. of
Governors
of
the
Fed.
Reserve
Sys.
(Jan.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm (arguing that employment is
driven primarily by nonmonetary factors).
16
But some are not. In particular, the contention that the Fed creates money out of thin air is an almost
comically distorted description of how money comes into existence. Indeed, if one understands what
money is and the role of a central bank, saying that money is created out of thin air is not a criticism but
merely a colorfully misleading metaphor. See infra, Part I.
17
The Fed’s low interest rate policy has been criticized from the political right, suggesting that low
interest rates alone inexorably led to the housing bubble. See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, Federal Reserve
Policy and the Housing Bubble, 29 CATO J. 115, 115–19 (2009); John B. Taylor, How Government
Created
the
Financial
Crisis,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Feb.
9,
2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123414310280561945. With appropriate oversight, however, there is no
reason to think that low interest rates—which were justified as a macroeconomic policy matter—would
have led to the mortgage crisis.
18
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (reporting former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan’s admission that he
found a “flaw” in his economic philosophy and was “partially” wrong in “. . . presuming that the selfinterests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting
their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”) See also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 52–66 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (noting the lack of effective regulation and
the failure of federal officials to identify systemic risk); Bryan J. Orticelli, Note, Crisis Compounded by
Constraint: How Regulatory Inadequacies Impaired the Fed’s Bailout of Bear Stearns, 42 CONN. L. REV.
647, 650–51 (2009) (arguing that fragmented regulatory authority contributed to the Fed’s inability to
anticipate systemic risk). As Professor Omarova observes, the very power to exempt financial institutions
from Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §371c (2006) (amended 2010), that some critics
claim the Fed abused in bailing out firms, played a key role in creating the risky “shadow banking” regime
in the lead-up to the crisis. See Saule T. Omarova, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: From
Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of §23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 1683, 1702–29 (2011).
19
Several bills have been proposed over the years calling for a full audit of the Fed Board of Governors
and the Reserve Banks by the Comptroller General. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015,
S. 264, 114th Cong. (2015); Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 24, 114th Cong. (2015);
Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2014, H.R. 24, 113th Cong. (2013); Federal Reserve Transparency
Act of 2013, S. 209, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Audit the Fed Act of 2013, H.R. 33, 113th Cong. (2013)
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curtail Fed independence, thus subjecting monetary policy to greater supervision by
elected officials.20
Subjecting the Fed to close political oversight would likely have harmful, perhaps
even disastrous, consequences. Any country or, as in the case of the European Union,
transnational political unit, that maintains its own currency, needs a central bank that is
independent of close political oversight in order to ensure that politicians do not
manipulate the monetary system for short-term political gain at the risk of inflicting longterm economic damage. The classic worry is that incumbents will provide excessive
economic stimulus in the months leading up to an election, even when the best economic
analysis would call for tightening the spigot. 21 Accordingly, although the Fed is a
creation of Congress rather than the Constitution itself, its independence can be justified
with structural arguments similar to those typically offered to justify the independence of
the Article III judiciary. Just as we cannot fully trust majoritarian politics to safeguard the
constitutional rights of minorities, so we cannot trust venial politicians with incentives
timed to the political cycle to set monetary policy timed to the business cycle, all the
while keeping in mind longer-term goals of growth and stability.
Ironically, however, in the current climate the harmful consequences of ending or
auditing the Fed would not flow from the profligacy of politicians but from their foolish
commitment to austerity. We need the Fed to be independent now in large part because
subjecting it to close scrutiny by politically accountable actors would likely lead to
unduly tight monetary policy. The Fed could no longer use monetary policy to counteract
the baleful effects of ideologically driven tight fiscal policy. It would become part of the
problem rather than part of the solution. Thus, even if the standard justification of the
Fed’s independence envisions the Fed tilting against too-loose monetary preferences
among politicians, from an economic perspective, that justification applies equally when

(proposing reform of the manner in which the Comptroller General audits the Board of Governors). See
also Bernie Sanders, To Rein in Wall Street, Fix the Fed, N.Y.TIMES A23 (Dec. 23, 2015) (“We need to . . .
require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a full and independent audit of the Fed each and
every year.”).
20
Following convention, in this Article we refer to Fed “independence” simply to connote the fact that
the Fed does not answer directly to the president or to Congress, but not to suggest that, as currently
structured, outside actors, including political actors, have no influence on the Fed. If meant to imply some
notion of pure economic expertise divorced from other constraints, we agree with Peter Conti-Brown’s
assessment that “ ‘independence’ . . . is a concept without much analytical content.” PETER CONTI-BROWN,
THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE xii (2016). As Conti-Brown explains, the very
complexity of the Fed’s structure belies the image of the Fed as a single expert actor. See id. at 8 (“the Fed
is one of the most organizationally complex entities in the federal government . . . [,] a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’ ”)
We nonetheless find the term “independence” useful as a shorthand for the degree of autonomy from
elected officials that the Federal Reserve system currently enjoys relative to typical federal agencies within
the executive branch.
21
Even as he deconstructs the concept of Fed independence, Conti-Brown provides a serviceable account
of the standard justification for it: “Fed independence is the separation, by statute, of the central bankers
(specifically the Fed Chair) and the politicians (specifically the president) for purposes of maintaining low
inflation. [C]itizens in a democracy naturally prefer a prosperous economy. Politicians please us by giving
us that prosperity, or at least trying to take credit for it. But when there is no prosperity to be had,
politicians will resort to goosing the economy artificially by running the printing presses to provide enough
money and credit for all. The short-term result is reelection for the politicians. The long-term result is
worthless money that wreaks havoc on our economic, social, and political institutions.” Id. at 2.
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politician’s preferences point in the opposite direction. Either way, the Fed serves as an
important counterweight to politically motivated excess.
Is this reversal of the standard justification for central bank independence merely
ironic, or does it raise a deeper problem of democratic accountability? So long as we can
point to structural reasons for Fed independence, we have an answer to whatever
“counter-majoritarian difficulty” such independence raises.22 But if our best justification
for Fed independence is that politicians frequently make bad economic decisions, then
the argument for Fed independence has no logical stopping point. Politicians make bad
decisions in many areas. They under-invest in infrastructure; they deny climate change;
they subsidize industries that harm human health; they enact criminal laws that destroy
the lives of nonviolent offenders and their families; and so forth. If the risk of merely
sub-optimal policies emerging from the political process justifies lodging power in expert
agencies subject to little or no political oversight, then there will be very little room for
governance by elected officials.
Can Fed independence be justified on grounds that do not also justify technocracy
across the board? This Article argues that it can be.
Even though we currently live in an age in which surprisingly large numbers of
policy makers are committed to economic austerity, the classic worry that political actors,
if given the chance, will loosen credit when they ought to tighten it, is real and could
recur. Just as Vincent Blasi has argued that one ought to take a “pathological perspective”
by designing constitutional rules governing free speech to protect against the worst of
times, even if we usually live in good times,23 so too here, institutional design of our
government institutions regarding the economy should be constructed for the long run.
And in the long run, political actors have incentives to manipulate monetary policy—and
to try to intimidate the Fed in an attempt to change regulatory outcomes—to their
advantage. Even if one disagrees with our economic analysis, and approves of austerity,
the Fed’s independence should be protected.
Our point is not simply that political actors will slight the long-term health of the
economy for short-term gains. After all, political actors have incentives to focus on the
short run with respect to many policy areas. Under-investment in infrastructure results in
part from the fact that the benefits of infrastructure projects are spread out over many
years.24 Likewise, addressing environmental problems may require current sacrifices to
benefit future generations. 25 If the shortsightedness of politicians were the only
justification for Fed independence, then the argument really would amount to advocacy
for technocracy tout court.
22

Alexander Bickel coined the term “counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe the uneasy place of
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short-term benefits to current constituents of tax cuts or transfer payments.
25
See generally Neil H. Buchanan, What Kind of Environment Do We Owe Future Generations? 15
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But political control of a central bank does not merely create a risk of shortsighted
policy. It creates a risk of self-dealing of the same sort that, in other contexts, is thought
to justify departures from majoritarianism in the name of constitutional democracy. We
have already mentioned the independent judiciary as guarantor of minority rights as a
constitutionally enshrined example of this sort of institutional design. There are also
subconstitutional examples, such as the use of special prosecutors to investigate and
prosecute high-ranking executive officials and the use of politically-independent election
commissions or ostensibly neutral courts to supervise the election process. Although
these kinds of institutions have been implemented imperfectly in the United States, they
rest on some of the same basic logic that justifies an independent Fed: Incumbent elected
officials ought not to be permitted to use the tools of government to gain unfair advantage
in political contests. As John Hart Ely famously put the point in defending representationreinforcing judicial review, counter-majoritarianism is easiest to justify when it serves to
prevent the “ins” from exploiting their position to stay “in.”26
In addition, the sheer scale of the problems that a central bank must confront—
encompassing the entire economy and posing risks of catastrophe such as hyperinflation
or depression—and the speed with which it must act in the face of an emergency, call for
an institution that can respond with alacrity. It might be thought that, following the logic
of Federalist No. 70, the “Energy in the Executive” permits the president to oversee a
central bank that can respond to financial crises rapidly and effectively.27 But because of
the need to calm markets in troubled times, the Fed’s policymaking board —indeed the
Federal Reserve System as a whole—has sensibly been given policy independence, with
political accountability ultimately deriving from the appointment and removal processes
for Fed governors and regional bank presidents as well as Congress’s power (which it has
thus far wisely chosen not to exercise) to change the statutory mandate of the Fed
(indeed, to dismantle the Fed entirely) at any time, subject to the reactions of the public
and the financial markets to any meddling with the Fed’s historical mandate and
powers.28 Indeed, as we explain at greater length below, in general and in times of crisis,
the Fed’s status as an entity that is not really a part of any of the three branches of
government enables it to act as an independent counter-party to transactions with the
more directly presidentially accountable (and thus politically manipulable) Treasury
Department.
Although it is possible to imagine some of the current regulatory responsibilities
of the Fed being reallocated to more directly accountable government agencies,
independence contributes substantially to its ability to perform its key function as a
central bank. As we argue in Part I, moreover, the interactions between the Fed’s
regulatory responsibilities and its mandate to conduct monetary policy writ large make
sense of the Fed’s current, broad portfolio.
This Article examines and responds to critiques of Fed independence in four
parts. Part I presents a brief schematic overview of the structure and powers of the Fed.
Part II catalogues the main criticisms of the Fed, distinguishing those that, if valid, could
be addressed by modest statutory changes, from those that fundamentally challenge Fed
independence. Part III explains how the Fed used its powers during the 2008 financial
26
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Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
28
See supra note 1.

27

9

crisis and its aftermath to stabilize the economy, and how it might play an essential role
in rescuing the economy in the event that the United States finds itself unable to pay its
bills due to debt ceiling brinksmanship. Part IV then elaborates the argument for Fed
independence even in an era of austerity, explaining how an independent central bank fits
in the overall constitutional design. We conclude by identifying a connection between
contemporary anxiety about Fed independence and a longstanding but deeply problematic
strain of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian populism dating to the earliest days of the American
Republic.
I.

An Independent Central Bank: The Structure and Powers of the Federal
Reserve

The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. Like the Bank of
England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank (as well as the national
central banks that the latter institution replaced, including the Bundesbank and the
Banque de France), the Federal Reserve was created to control the levers of monetary
policy, most importantly including setting interest rates (and thus controlling the supply
of money). In turn, these responsibilities for carrying out monetary policy at the
macroeconomic level require that it have significant regulatory powers over the banking
system.
The roots of the Fed date back to the earliest years of the Republic. The First
Bank of the United States—the earliest predecessor to the Fed—served a number of vital
functions, but it was not a central bank in the modern sense. In any event, its charter
expired in 1811, leaving the United States without a nationally chartered bank until 1816,
when the Second Bank of the United States was created.29 In the intervening period, the
United States nearly lost the War of 1812, partly because its efforts were severely
hampered by the lack of enthusiasm of state-chartered private banks for providing credit
to the federal government.30 Consequently, following the war, President James Madison,
whose Jeffersonian Republican Party had previously opposed the Bank, signed into law
the bill creating the Second Bank of the United States.31 A few years later, Chief Justice
John Marshall pithily alluded to this history in McCulloch v. Maryland, when he wrote
that “a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First
Bank] exposed the Government convinced those who were most prejudiced against the
measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the” law chartering the Second
Bank.32
Nonetheless, President Andrew Jackson vetoed legislation that would have
renewed the Second Bank’s charter, offering populist and xenophobic reasons.33 In the
nearly eight decades between the cessation of operations of the Second Bank and the
establishment of the Federal Reserve, the federal government continued to develop a
system to regulate banks. For example, during and after the Civil War, Congress passed a
29
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series of banking statutes, 34 which were most directly aimed at allowing the federal
government to borrow money to finance the war effort, but which also established a
national currency, created a national banking system, set up a system to regulate
commercial banks, and enacted other important regulatory and policy innovations.35 At
the same time, however, the lack of a federal central bank left the states to regulate
banking in parallel with the much weaker federal regulatory system. The monetary
system changed and largely improved over time, but the progress was halting and
sporadic.
The history of this period is, not coincidentally, littered with periodic financial
crises (then called “panics”), which bled over from Wall Street to Main Street and
became severe economic depressions. Among the worst of these were the Panic of 1873
and the Panic of 1907, the latter of which finally moved Congress to create a central bank
for the United States, which came into being in 1913.
Even though the political climate in 1913 finally allowed the creation of a central
bank for the United States, Jacksonian distrust of centralized financial power remained a
potent force. In particular, the popular appeal of political figures such as William
Jennings Bryan was based in large part on the public’s fear of Wall Street and worries
about the power of banks over people’s lives. As a result, the country’s new central bank
was not called “The Bank of the United States,” or “The Central Bank of America.”
Instead, President Wilson chose the anodyne name “Federal Reserve System.” That
political sensitivity carried over from the naming of the central bank to the creation of a
rather byzantine structure.

A. The Structure of the Federal Reserve
Given the fear of centralizing financial power in New York or Washington, the
new Federal Reserve System was created to give the appearance of a nationwide
structure, based on what looks like a confederation of twelve regional Federal Reserve
banks.36 Although they would be part of the federal government, these regional banks
were located in important cities across the country, generally reflecting regional
population patterns in 1913.37
However, had those regional banks been an important part of the policymaking
apparatus (or, for that matter, if they had even been helpful in connecting local economies
with the central bank), one would have expected to see the creation of more regional
federal reserve banks as the economic and demographic centers of gravity in the United
States moved westward. Instead, more than a century after its creation, the same twelve
Federal Reserve Banks continue to operate, and no new banks have come into existence.
It is particularly notable that the only Federal Reserve regional bank in the western half
34
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of the United States is in San Francisco, even as regional banks continue to operate in, for
example, Richmond, Cleveland, and Kansas City.38
The only policymaking power bestowed on regional banks is through their
representation on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 39 That committee
includes all twelve presidents of the regional banks, only five of whom have voting
powers at any given time.40 By contrast, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System consists of seven presidential appointees, each serving fourteen-year terms.41 The
President appoints one of those governors as the chairperson of the Fed, for a four-year
renewable term, subject to confirmation by the Senate.42
The real policymaking power in the Federal Reserve, then, resides in the Board of
Governors, which is located in Washington. Although the regional presidents vote on the
FOMC, they are, by design, outnumbered by the presidentially appointed governors of
the system. Effectively, therefore, the Fed is run as a central bank, from the nation’s
capital.

B. The Powers of the Federal Reserve
Even as the United States was hampered by the frequent panics in the preFed period, the country was emerging as a global economic power. Accordingly, the
Fed’s designers sought to construct an institution with powers commensurate to the
nation’s role in the global economy. They bestowed upon it powers that would allow the
Fed to intervene when necessary to prevent the financial system from spinning out of
control. Financial stability is its central concern.
The Fed is commonly referred to as the “lender of last resort” to signify that the
Fed will lend money to key financial players when private sector actors cannot or will not
do so, and when the financial system cannot otherwise withstand the disruption that
would come from the collapse of a systemically important institution. The financial
system occasionally comes under severe pressure and is in danger of collapse, because
banks or other financial institutions unexpectedly find themselves short of funds needed
to continue operating. For example, if a large bank were to announce an unexpected loss
or other worrying news, other banks (in what is known as a “contagion effect”) could find
that their depositors withdraw more funds from their accounts than they would otherwise
wish to withdraw, simply as a matter of caution. This can then create a series of “runs” on
banks, all of which need more money on hand than usual to prevent default. None of
those institutions would necessarily have engaged in any unwise behavior that would
38
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have precipitated the crisis, but all are in danger of collapse because of the interconnected
nature of the financial system.
Any such situation poses risks for the real economy as well, because even the
most basic operations of a modern business rely on the availability of ready credit.
Businesses typically pay their suppliers and employees on a predictable (and legally
enforceable) schedule, rather than having to wait until their accounts receivable actually
become cash in hand, because those businesses have relationships with banks that smooth
out cash flows. Moreover, when banks begin to pull back on loans that would have
financed other businesses’ expansions, or when fewer home mortgages are offered, and
so on, the effects cascade onto those whose transactions are contingent on the original
loan being completed. (For example, the sellers of House A cannot buy their dream house
B unless the buyer of House A receives the loan necessary to close the deal. If that deal
falls through, the seller of House B is similarly unable to proceed with her plans to buy
House C, and so on.)
These risks are inherent in any financial system, because every creditor-debtor
relationship is predicated on the ability of the rest of the financial system to provide flows
of funds to enable business to be transacted. Therefore, the lender-of-last-resort role of
the Federal Reserve is fundamental to its effectiveness as the primary regulator of the
U.S. financial system.43
Giving the Fed the power to lend money wherever and whenever needed to
prevent a crisis, however, necessarily raises two related questions. First, where does the
Fed get the money necessary to inject into the financial system when it is needed? And
second, if the Fed can put new money into the system at will, might the Fed not run the
risk of creating too much money, thus raising the possibility that it would inadvertently
set off an inflationary spiral?44
The answer to the first question—where does the money come from? —is
counterintuitive but ultimately unavoidable in any economy that is not simply a barter
system. Every government, whether or not it nominally ties its currency to a commodity
such as gold or silver, and whether or not it creates a central bank, ultimately has the
power to create money where money did not exist before. Certainly, every central bank
must have that power in order to fulfill its central role as lender of last resort, or else it
too would be powerless to break out of the market contagions and other threats that arise
in the financial system. When everyone else is pulling back, the central bank must be able
to extend itself and do what others cannot or will not do.
43
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As a technical matter, the Fed can create money simply by buying assets from
private and government actors, with those actors accepting a check from the Fed. Why
does the counter-party accept a check from the Fed? Because it is a check from the Fed,
and the Fed is the guarantor of money. Money is, ultimately, an exercise in group
psychology.45 The Fed thus creates money by “injecting” newly created funds into the
financial system, in so doing accumulating assets on its balance sheet, which are matched
on the liability side by the Fed’s legal requirement to stand behind its money, that is, the
dollars that it has created.46
The second question noted above—If the Fed can create money at will, how can
we guarantee that it will not create too much money? —raises the key issue underlying
all of modern monetary policy. The answer, however, is generally provided not by having
the Fed concern itself directly with the number of dollars that it has created (although it
certainly keeps close track of all such “monetary aggregates”), but with the indirect effect
that its asset purchases have on interest rates. That is, when the Fed buys (and sometimes
sells) government bonds, it can make the prices of those bonds go up or down. Because
the interest rates on bonds are inversely related to the bonds’ prices, the Fed can directly
target interest rates for government bonds.47 For example, if the Fed believes that the
interest rate is too low, it can sell bonds, pushing down the price of those bonds and thus
pushing up their interest rate.48
Although the Fed can also adjust other levers of monetary policy (changing the
interest rate on loans that it makes directly to commercial banks,49 as well as changing the
rules that allow commercial banks to turn deposits into loans50), the Fed carries out its
monetary policy power role almost exclusively through its purchases and sales of
government bonds through “open market operations.” Those operations allow the Fed to
control interest rates, and (as noted above) concomitantly determine how much money
the Fed creates.
Together, these mechanisms enable the Fed to create as much money as is
necessary to keep the economy healthy, and no more. The Federal Reserve Act requires
the Fed to engage in policies to promote “stable prices,” which means that if the Fed
needs to create money to avert a crisis (through its key role as lender of last resort), it
45
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must continually ensure that its pre- and post-crisis actions recalibrate the setting of
interest rates and the creation of money to keep the economy from overheating and thus
igniting inflation.
Importantly, however, the Federal Reserve Act requires the Fed (acting through
the FOMC) to do more than guard against the possibility that inflation will get out of
control. The Fed must also “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”51 That is, in addition to worrying
about inflation (which, again, means worrying about interest rates being too low), the Fed
must also attempt to balance concerns about inflation with concerns about
unemployment. One sure way to keep prices low, after all, would be to push up interest
rates, but that would lead to increases in unemployment. By law, however, the Fed must
strike a reasonable balance between inflation and unemployment.
What constitutes such a reasonable balance? Congress spoke to this issue with the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 52 in which it specified that the
President should aim for zero percent inflation and three percent unemployment from
1988 onward. 53 Congress further instructed the Fed to coordinate its monetary policy
with the President’s policy, thus at least committing the Fed to those goals at one step of
remove.
In practice, however, those goals have never been met. The unemployment rate
briefly dipped below four percent during 2000, but it has never reached three percent, and
it has averaged above five percent even in non-recessionary years. 54 Similarly, the
inflation rate has been generally positive (though still quite low) throughout this period.
Perhaps more importantly, the Fed several years ago announced a policy goal of two
percent inflation—not as a maximum, but as a specific target —based on economic
research suggesting that there are needlessly high costs to trying to achieve zero inflation,
and that a stable higher target would afford the Fed greater latitude in responding to
crises.55
Even though the specific targets in the 1978 law have not been achieved (and
might not even be achievable), the Fed is still required to engage in a balancing act,
applying its delegated power to set interest rates and to regulate the financial system to
minimize both inflation and unemployment.56 Disagreements about the relative weights
51
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that the Fed has put on unemployment versus inflation have fueled some of the criticisms
of the Fed that we describe in Part II below.
Indeed, some critics of the Fed believe that it should have no policy discretion at
all, and that the Fed should instead become nothing more than the employer of a group of
technicians who enact a mechanical monetary rule that is set in law by Congress. We next
explain why the Fed should not only continue to be given the latitude to adjust policy by
applying its reasoned judgment, but that such judgment will be best exercised in an
environment where the Fed is largely protected from direct influence by political actors.

C. Why Is the Federal Reserve Independent, and What Does That Entail?
As we explained in the preceding sub-Part, the Federal Reserve’s raison d’être
(based on what might be thought of as its “origin story” in the aftermath of the series of
financial panics in the 19th and early 20th centuries) creates a series of related
imperatives in the Fed’s structure and policy goals. Because the Fed must be able to
prevent financial crises, it must be able to provide “liquidity” —that is, to create new
money—when the various actors in the financial system simultaneously engage in selfprotecting (and individually rational) actions that could create catastrophic cascading
effects. But if the Fed is to be the lender of last resort, it must be mindful that its
emergency lending activities can have effects on the money supply and perforce on
interest rates. Thus, in order to do its primary job —to prevent financial and economic
crises—the Fed must either coordinate with some other (already-extant or hypothetical)
agency that is setting money supply and interest rates on a non-emergency basis, or the
Fed itself must be given the power to control the money supply and interest rates in both
good times and bad. As a practical matter, even if those roles were separated, the two
agencies would need to act effectively as one in order to follow their respective and
related policy mandates. And once Congress has given the Fed control over monetary
policy in general, it makes sense that the Fed should consider the effects of its policy
choices not just on inflation but on unemployment, growth, and other economic policy
goals as well.
Having said all of that, however, there is nothing in our account to this point that
would require a central bank to be politically independent. That is, the power to create
and control the monetary system, which in the United States is an enumerated power of
Congress, 57 could be directly carried out by Congress itself, as part of its ongoing
legislative agenda. Just as Congress has not created a politically insulated board to
control fiscal policy (taxing and spending),58 it could decide that it wants to take regular
votes on monetary policy issues, setting interest rates directly or indirectly by majority
votes in both houses of Congress (subject to the usual Article I, Section 7 rules of
presidential vetoes and overrides). Although members of Congress generally possess no
expertise in monetary policy, our system of governance does not require expertise, but
only democratic representation.
require the inflation rate to be zero. Prices can rise at a predictable rate and be “stable” in a meaningful
sense.
57
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Congress has wisely concluded, however, that its lack of expertise in monetary
policy is good reason to delegate its authority to an expert body. Even so, the various
duties that the Fed currently carries out, especially the highly essential function of setting
interest rates that we described in sub-Part I.B above, could in principle be delegated to
the executive branch. The Treasury Department already bears responsibility for creating
physical coins and currency,59 and it also carries out various delegated functions of fiscal
policy, including borrowing funds to finance federal budget deficits (as we discuss in Part
III below). Congress could thus further delegate to Treasury or some other executive
branch agency the authority not only to implement aspects of monetary policy but to
formulate it as well, so long as Congress complied with the minimal requirement of
articulating some “intelligible principle” to guide the agency.60
Running monetary policy through either of the political branches, however, would
leave open the possibility that the vicissitudes of electoral politics could lead to monetary
policy decisions that are keyed to short-term political gains, leading to short-term
economic volatility and threatening to undermine longer-term stability and growth.
Indeed, the classic argument in favor of a politically insulated monetary authority, as
noted in the Introduction, has always been based on the concern that political actors
would tend to create too much money, thus risking ever-rising inflation. History is
littered with examples of exactly this kind of catastrophe.61
As we describe in Parts III and IV, moreover, this is not the only possible reason
to set up the monetary authority as a politically independent agency. Especially in the
current political environment, it turns out that the Fed can act as an appropriate counterbalance against political winds that would slow the economy down.
In any event, the current structure of the Federal Reserve creates the kind of
policy independence that we think is now more important than ever. Although we
recognize that independence is a matter of multi-dimensional degree rather than a simple
on/off proposition,62 we think it clear that along the most relevant dimensions, the Fed
counts as relatively independent, rather than relatively accountable to the president or to
Congress. The terms of the Fed’s governors are long (fourteen years) and staggered, so
that no single president is likely to be able to reshape the Fed’s policy preferences on a
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wholesale basis.63 And even if the president could do so, he would not be able to demand
the resignations of Fed governors who subsequently act contrary to the president’s
immediate preferences.
Similarly, the other voting members of the FOMC are presidents of the regional
Federal Reserve Banks. The selection process for regional bank presidents involves even
less direct input from the political branches. Although we agree with critics who suggest
that the regional presidents should also be presidentially appointed (and, like the Fed’s
governors, subject to confirmation by the Senate), 64 the FOMC under either system
possesses the ability to act independently. Voting in an unpopular way cannot result in
firing or censure.
Even so, the Fed can still fairly be described as accountable in an important sense.
All of the voting members have undergone rigorous public vetting, and all of them have
reason to be judicious in making policy choices, because they are under intense scrutiny
at all times. Moreover, everyone knows that the Federal Reserve exists by act of
Congress, and that Congress could at any time change the degree of independence under
which the Fed operates, including shutting it down entirely. Reining in the Fed in that
way is rightly controversial, and it is understood that efforts to make even moderate
changes to the Fed (or to the rules governing monetary policy more generally) should be
undertaken with great care, because of the possible effects of such momentous changes
on financial markets and the broader economy. Indeed, we argue throughout this Article
that the Fed ought not be made substantially more accountable than it currently is. Even
so, the Fed is always on notice that it is not truly free to act only on its own judgment. By
contrast with members of the federal judiciary, whose life tenure and salary protection
could not be eliminated except by a constitutional amendment, the Fed’s independence
could be modified or revoked by ordinary legislation.
In addition, Congress has required that the Fed’s chair testify regularly before the
relevant committees of the House and Senate, which gives the Fed and Congress the
opportunity to engage in (sometimes highly contentious) public exchanges about policy
goals.
In these very important senses, therefore, the Fed is “politically accountable but
policy independent.” 65 This policy independence, however, is currently under attack.
Implementing the critics’ proposals to undermine Fed independence would harm the
Fed’s ability to act as a necessary counter-weight to other policymakers, especially
during a real or potential crisis, as we describe below in Parts III and IV. Before coming
to those arguments, in Part II we summarize the proposals of the Fed’s critics.
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65
See id.

18

II.

Criticisms of the Federal Reserve

Proposals to “end” or “audit” the Fed come from critics on both the right and the
left. In some respects the various critiques converge, but they also differ on key points.
Perhaps more important than sorting conservative from progressive critiques of the Fed is
the task of sorting along another axis: between those critiques that, if credited as fair,
could be addressed by relatively minor statutory amendments and those that pose a
challenge to Fed independence with respect to its fundamental role in making monetary
policy decisions, to act as a lender of last resort, and to coordinate its regulatory role with
its policymaking role. This Part briefly describes the leading objections with an eye to
this latter dichotomy. Because we conclude that some of the criticisms, if credited, really
would set the stage for seriously curtailing Fed independence, we turn in the subsequent
Parts to underscoring the practical and theoretical grounds for supporting such
independence.

A. Statutory Authority
During and after the 2008 financial crisis, various critics complained that the Fed
acted beyond its statutory authority. The most common complaint was that the Fed
created dummy entities in order to purchase private assets that it lacked the power to
purchase directly. This criticism tends to focus on the bailouts of two systemically
important financial institutions: Bear Stearns (in the lead-up to the crisis); and AIG (at the
height of the crisis). The critics argue that while the Fed has the emergency power to
extend credit on favorable terms,66 the power of the Fed (and the regional banks in the
Federal Reserve System) to purchase assets generally extends only to government-issued
instruments, 67 with such powers as the Fed does have to purchase private assets
circumscribed by collateral requirements, time limits, and other constraints.68 According
to one critic, in creating special-purpose vehicles to bail out Bear Stearns and AIG, “the
Fed attempted to use legal trickery to disguise its illegal purchases of private assets from
these companies,” and thus “acted outside the scope of its statutory authority by
effectively purchasing assets that did not fall within the narrow purchase authority
provided by the Federal Reserve Act.”69 Other commentators draw similar conclusions.70
Are the critics right? Were the Bear and AIG bailouts illegal? We think the
answer is not entirely clear-cut. We agree that the transactions were loans in form but
purchases in substance. Yet it does not obviously follow that they were illegal. The law
sometimes disregards form in favor of function, but not always. Moreover, at the relevant
time, no statutory provision expressly forbade the Fed from using its lending authority to
accomplish de facto purchases. The argument for finding in the Federal Reserve Act a
tacit prohibition on asset purchases rests on the assumption that if Congress meant to
66
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delegate purchase authority to the Fed it would have done so expressly, because where
Congress did delegate such authority, it came with limits. Silence in this context, goes the
argument, is a denial of authority.
Nonetheless, two factors point in the other direction. First, the very idea of
emergency lending authority connotes some flexibility. Part of what makes an emergency
an emergency is the fact that prior actions did not or could not prepare for the existing
circumstances. Thus, one might think that emergency authority should be treated as
sufficiently elastic to meet the pressing needs of the moment. As Adam Levitin explains,
while it is true that the Fed’s lending authority was envisioned as authorizing measures to
provide liquidity rather than to ensure the solvency of particular firms, during crises
(including the last crisis), the line between liquidity and solvency blurs.71
Second, as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule note, even if the best reading of the
statutes would render the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts unlawful, standard
administrative law doctrine grants to agencies the power to adopt a reasonable
construction of the statutes they administer, even if that construction is not the
construction that a court would give the statutes considering the matter de novo.72 They
acknowledge that the AIG bailout was “a loan in form” but “a purchase in substance.”
Nonetheless, they conclude that “[a] court might find that, in the circumstances, the Fed’s
implicit interpretation of the statute to permit purchases of distressed nonbank firms in
emergency conditions was reasonable.”73
We think it is, at the very least, uncertain whether the Fed’s bailouts of Bear
Stearns and AIG were legal. However, even if one is persuaded that the Fed acted beyond
its statutory authority, and thus illegally, that does not necessarily point to any systemic
problem calling for a systemic remedy. The argument that the Fed’s actions were legal is
at least non-frivolous, and it should hardly come as a surprise that agencies occasionally
assert powers beyond their statutory mandates. When an agency does so, absent judicial
intervention, the proper remedy is for Congress to clarify prospectively that the agency
either possesses or lacks the relevant power.
Here Congress chose the latter course. Section 1101(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act74
amended section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act to clarify that henceforward any Fed
“program or facility that is structured to remove assets from the balance sheet of a single
and specific company” is ineligible for the sort of emergency lending that the Fed used in
combination with the creation of a special purpose vehicle during the financial crisis.75
Whether that was the right judgment is also uncertain. If one thinks, as we do, that
the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts were important measures to stabilize the economy,
71
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then one would want to clarify that the Fed has the tools to take similar measures in the
event of a future crisis. However, viewed ex ante, one might think that by clearly denying
the Fed the power to relieve financial firms of their toxic assets, Dodd-Frank removes an
incentive for firms to accumulate risky assets that may turn toxic. In this view, DoddFrank binds the Fed to the mast when the financial seas are calm, thus signaling to large
interconnected firms that the Fed will have no choice but to resist their siren song in the
event that their investment strategy threatens to crash the global economy; thus, they will
not undertake systemically risky investment strategies in the first place. Similarly, the
Fed will have even more reason to be vigilant in monitoring financial developments and
preventing crises from developing, lest it find itself faced with another crisis after having
been stripped of its best policy response.
We express no view on whether Congress made the right decision by clarifying in
Dodd-Frank that the Fed lacks both de jure and de facto authority to purchase troubled
financial assets. For our purposes it suffices to note that the questions about the legality
of the Fed bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG do not rise to the level of a structural
problem calling for a structural solution such as ending or auditing the Fed.
Nor does Dodd-Frank’s clarification of any prior ambiguity in the Federal
Reserve Act touch on the central issue of Fed independence. The Fed bailed out Bear
Stearns and AIG because no other institution of government was able to do so in a timely
fashion, and it had at least a colorable claim of authority. But bailouts need not be a core
function of a central bank. True, just as there are reasons of political economy to vest
monetary policy in an independent central bank, there are similar reasons to vest bailout
authority in a financial actor that is independent of short-term political pressure. In this
context too, political accountability can lead to dangerous departures from sound
economic policy.76 And arguably, considerations of expertise suggest that the power to
bail out systemically important firms ought to be given to the same independent central
bank that already addresses other matters of macroeconomic policy through loans as well
as purchases and sales of financial assets.
However, it is also possible to delegate bailout authority to some other
independent agency. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has long had
resolution authority for a class of depositary institutions, and Title II of Dodd Frank
expanded its role with respect to systemically important financial institutions.77 Whether
or not the Fed, rather than some other independent agency, has bailout authority simply
76
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does not bear on Fed independence with respect to monetary policy. As noted in Part I,
separating these functions would necessitate some coordination among agencies that
could, at least during a crisis, functionally turn those separate agencies into a single
decision-making unit, but that is not necessarily a problem. It would not be our first
choice to separate these functions, but separating them would say nothing about the
wisdom of maintaining the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort (because the FDIC
would, if the crisis were large enough, run out of money), and to conduct independent
monetary policy.
Does this mean that the complaints by critics that the Fed broke the law during the
financial crisis can be ignored as irrelevant to our project? Probably, but not necessarily.
We acknowledge that a longstanding pattern of law breaking by a government agency
would be cause for dramatically reforming, or even abolishing, that agency. However, in
our view, the claim that the Fed exceeded its authority in the Bear Stearns and AIG
bailouts, even when fully credited, does not come close to demonstrating a pattern of law
breaking. The bailouts, the complaint that they were illegal, and the congressional
response in Dodd-Frank were an important episode in and after the financial crisis, but
they do not bear on the fundamental question of central bank independence.78

B. Transparency
Critics also charge that the Fed is insufficiently transparent.79 The validity of this
criticism varies with respect to task. The Fed achieves its various objectives through two
kinds of actions. In stabilizing the macroeconomy, the Fed buys and sells financial assets,
especially Treasury securities. Although situated differently from private actors, in taking
such actions, the Fed functions as a kind of market actor. Meanwhile, the Fed also has
regulatory authority over various market actors. In carrying out its role as regulator, the
Fed operates much like any other agency, promulgating rules and bringing enforcement
actions.80
78
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In carrying out its regulatory mandates, the Fed ought to be—and is—no less
transparent than most other agencies. In general, modern administrative law strikes a
balance between deference to agency expertise and accountability by imposing
procedural constraints on agency rulemaking, enforcement actions, and adjudication.
More than anything, these constraints aim to expose the reasons for agency decision
making—that is, to render agency action transparent. The Fed falls within the sweeping
definition of covered agencies in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 81 and thus, as
a regulator, it is legally as transparent as any other agency82—and more transparent, at
least as a formal matter, than those agencies that are specifically exempt from the APA.
With respect to rulemaking, for example, like any other agency covered by the APA, if
the Fed wishes its regulations to receive deference in court, it must follow the notice-andcomment procedure affording the public rights to participate.83
Perhaps it could be argued that because the Fed, as an independent agency, is not
politically accountable, it ought to be subject to stricter transparency requirements than
executive branch agencies. This argument would, in our view, be mistaken. As we shall
explain momentarily,84 at some point, increased transparency amounts to external control.
Yet if it makes sense, all things considered, to grant some regulatory task to an
independent agency rather than to an executive branch agency, then it also makes sense
81
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to impose no greater transparency requirements on the independent agency; doing so
would render the independent agency politically accountable de facto, which would be
inconsistent with the initial judgment to make the agency independent.
To be clear, we do not need to quarrel with the claim that some of the regulatory
mission now assigned to the Fed might be better assigned to a politically accountable
actor, such as the Treasury Department. We take no position on that issue. Our point is
only that so long as Congress has good reason to assign a regulatory task to an
independent agency like the Fed, Congress also has good reason not to subject the agency
to stricter transparency obligations than are thought appropriate for executive agencies
engaged in regulation.
For our purposes, the more important question is whether the Fed is insufficiently
transparent with respect to monetary policy. As then-Chair of the Fed Ben Bernanke
acknowledged in a 2010 speech, the case for transparency of the Fed’s market-participant
functions is weaker than for the actions the Fed undertakes as a regulator.85 But even in
the course of championing central bank independence, Bernanke acknowledged that
weaker does not mean nonexistent, and Fed monetary policy is in fact somewhat open to
public scrutiny. Fed chairs regularly testify before Congress and give speeches, while the
FOMC—which sets monetary policy—releases minutes of its meetings and issues
reports.86 These measures, Bernanke argued, “provide[] substantial grist for the activities
of legions of ‘Fed watchers’ who analyze all aspects of monetary policy in great detail.”87
Bernanke was and is correct that the Fed is not a secret cabal. Still, it can be
argued that after-the-fact transparency does little good for those politicians and private
actors who disagree with Fed policy. When undertaking notice-and-comment rulemaking
pursuant to the APA, the Fed, like other agencies, must give the public an opportunity to
comment on its proposed action and then actually give consideration to the public’s input
before proceeding.88 By contrast, although the Fed can fairly be said to tell interested
observers what it is doing and why, there are no direct mechanisms for those observers to
challenge the Fed’s actions. As David Zaring observes, the FOMC is, in practice, “an
agency governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed
constraints.”89
Yet a transparency obligation, even without any mechanism for direct regulation,
can act as a form of behavior modification for the actor subject to the obligation.
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Transparency requirements for private firms90 as well as public actors91 often work on the
principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant. 92 At the same time, requirements of
complete transparency can backfire—as when open meeting laws have the unintended but
foreseeable consequence of driving the real action outside of the meeting and thus outside
of the spotlight.93 Most deliberative bodies need at least some opportunities to meet in
private so that members can speak freely. Even absent any illicit motives, both private
and public actors will hesitate to give voice to positions that they wish to explore
tentatively for fear that the public or a subset thereof will overreact. Where the relevant
actors are the policy makers of a central bank—and with global markets finely attuned to
interest rates—the risk is acute.
There are also questions of practicality. Each day the Fed (or more precisely, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the FOMC) purchases and sells
financial assets in order to carry out monetary policy. 94 These numerous transactions
could not possibly achieve their aim in real time if they were subject to the sort of back
and forth with the public associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Accordingly, during a July 2015 appearance before the House Financial Services
Committee, Fed Chair Janet Yellen resisted calls for greater direct oversight of the Fed,
treating proposed transparency requirements as a form of congressional control.95 One
need not agree with Yellen that current law requires exactly the right degree of Fed
90
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transparency to see two general truths: First, that for just about any entity, there is an
optimal level of transparency that falls short of total transparency; and second, that given
the tendency of transparency to bleed into external control, where policy factors justify
making an agency independent of direct external political control, the optimal level of
transparency for that agency will be somewhat less (other things being equal) than the
optimal level of transparency for agencies deemed properly subject to such control.96
Thus, the claim that the Fed is insufficiently transparent has two dimensions. To
the extent that the critics wish to see the Fed subject to greater transparency requirements
in its regulatory functions, they may or may not have a point, but even if they do, greater
transparency in this domain would not undermine the Fed’s core functions when it acts as
a central bank. This aspect of the claim touches nothing fundamental. However, to the
extent that the critics would like to see greater transparency in the Fed’s conduct of
monetary policy as a means of controlling monetary policy, the prescription would
undermine Fed independence in an area where such independence has been thought
essential to its role as a central bank.
C. Substantive Priorities
The Fed’s substantive mandate obligates it to set and carry out monetary policy in
such a manner that will “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates.”97 As we noted briefly in Part I, these objectives can conflict.
Other things being equal, and when the economy lacks substantial excess capacity, lower
interest rates boost employment but also increase the risk of inflation, and vice-versa.
Accordingly, actors with different interests will sometimes criticize the Fed for unduly
emphasizing one aspect of its mandate at the expense of another. To paint with a very
broad brush, conservatives would like the Fed to focus chiefly on fighting inflation, while
progressives would like to see the Fed promote economic growth and thus job growth.98
It is tempting to say that if the Fed is simultaneously being criticized from the
right for being too soft on inflation while being criticized from the left for being too soft
96
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on unemployment, then it must be doing its job just right by steering a middle course,
consistent with its multi-factor mandate. But that is not necessarily correct. Although
economists disagree about the relative contribution of the price shock in oil and monetary
policy in causing stagflation in the 1970s,99 there is little doubt that a poorly run central
bank (in combination with external public and private factors) can set and conduct
monetary policy in a way that neither constrains inflation nor promotes job growth. The
very possibility of stagflation shows that monetary policy is not necessarily a zero-sum
game, with every action that exacerbates one problem necessarily contributing to a
solution to the converse problem.
The post-2008 crisis period provides another, more positive example of how
inflation and unemployment are not strictly inversely correlated. Despite repeated dire
warnings by conservatives that extremely low interest rates would lead to runaway
inflation,100 the Fed’s policy—including effectively negative interest rates for some of the
recent period101—has not led to high inflation, even though that policy has been in place
for almost seven years.
Meanwhile, some of the policy preferences expressed by some conservatives are,
to put the point politely, not exactly reality-based. The charge that the Fed has “debased”
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the currency102 could most charitably be understood as a shorthand for the mistaken but
not completely irrational fear that increases in the money supply would lead to inflation.
The view is mistaken because the link between low interest rates and inflation depends on
the economy functioning at or close to full capacity. However, the fear is not irrational,
because timing is delicate. It is at least possible that a central banker could keep interest
rates too low too long out of the erroneous belief that the economy has more excess
capacity than it in fact has.
Yet some Fed critics pretty clearly do not simply mean their objections as
shorthand for a view about the timing of interest rate increases. Rather, in the period
since the crisis, some commentators have issued the debasement charge based on the
apparent belief that increasing the money supply is inherently problematic. For example,
the complaint that that the Fed’s policy of quantitative easing created money “out of thin
air”103 assumes as a baseline some definition of money that is not created out of thin air.
Yet that assumption is unwarranted. Any medium of exchange—including precious
metal—has value only because people believe that other people will continue to believe
that it has value. There are sound reasons why, in particular circumstances, the money
supply ought not to be increased, but the mere fact that a central bank in a sovereign
nation with its own currency can increase the money supply without having to discover
and dig up nuggets of a material that is arbitrarily denominated as valuable is not itself a
ground for concern.104
Likewise, calls by some on the right to amend the Fed’s mandate so that it only
focuses on inflation 105 cannot be taken at face value. A central bank that viewed its
mission as solely and constantly battling inflation would risk sending the economy into a
deflationary spiral that could easily turn into a depression. No one could sensibly
advocate that the Fed target a zero rate of inflation, because even a small error on the
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wrong side could yield deflation. Accordingly, the rational version of the conservative
critique of the Fed’s multi-prong mandate must be that the critics wish to see the balance
struck differently. So long as there is no serious risk of deflation, the critics mean (or at
least ought) to say, the Fed ought not permit additional inflation as the price of promoting
job growth.
That claim finds its mirror in a criticism by progressives that, notwithstanding its
multi-prong mandate, too often the Fed has prioritized fighting inflation over promoting
economic and job growth.106 This critique sometimes has an institutional component. The
Fed is a hybrid public/private entity that gives substantially greater weight to the interests
and outlook of bankers and investors than to the interests of Americans who live from
paycheck to paycheck. Accordingly, the argument goes, the Fed is rigged to favor its
inflation-fighting mandate at the expense of job growth.107
This charge strikes us as simplistic and unrealistic. It is certainly true that workers
(for example) are not directly represented in the Fed’s monetary-policy-making
processes. But it does not follow that their interests are unrepresented, partly because
economic progressives are not the only people who (other things being equal) prefer low
interest rates. Investors in stocks and holders of existing bonds like low interest rates as
well.108 Thus, insofar as the Fed’s structure gives weight to the preferences of investors,
that does not systematically disfavor pro-growth policies. And indeed, the Fed’s record
since the crisis (and somewhat less consistently, before the crisis as well) shows that
whatever else one might say about the Fed, it has hardly been captured by inflation
hawks.
To be clear, we do not claim that the Fed is a “Goldilocks” agency, always setting
monetary policy neither too much in one or the other direction but always “just right.”
We are keenly aware that when inflation and growth correlate inversely, as they often do,
it is possible for the Fed to err in one way or the other. Whether one thinks that the Fed
has, or over time likely will, err in either direction will depend on one’s interests and
106
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outlook. Our concern here is how judgments about the Fed’s priorities might translate
into concrete reforms.
In principle, it should be possible to set different priorities for the Fed without
challenging Fed independence. For example, the Fed’s statutory mandate could be
rewritten to specify a numerical target of, say, two percent annual inflation, or three
percent unemployment, or some particular formula that incorporated both—for example,
minimize unemployment unless further steps to promote employment would cause
inflation to rise above two percent.
In practice, however, the diversity of economic circumstances that can arise will
mean that a rigid numerical formula will likely lead to a policy path that even a proponent
of the formula would regard as suboptimal. For example, even holding inflation constant,
there will be disagreement about the so-called natural rate of unemployment, and a
statutory mandate based on assumptions that prove false over time could lead a Fed that
is bound by that mandate to adopt harmful monetary policies. In a macroeconomy that
can fairly be described as subject to the influence of “animal spirits,”109 any rule-like
approach to a central bank’s mandate will leave the central bank with insufficient
flexibility to rein in those spirits.
The solution—embodied in the Fed’s existing multi-factor mandate—is to
delegate to the central bank the discretion to make an all-things-considered judgment
about how to balance the sometimes-conflicting goals of monetary policy. This solution
should be very familiar to anyone acquainted with the modern administrative state. Given
the complexity and fluidity of the problem, a generalist legislature cannot formulate
sensible precise rules in advance, and so sets the broad outlines of the policy, leaving to
the agency the task of filling in the details.
Accordingly, whether one thinks that the Fed tends to favor too-loose or too-strict
monetary policy, one cannot sensibly propose ex ante formulaic controls on the Fed. This
may explain why, regardless of where they fall on the political spectrum, many critics of
the balance the Fed has struck among the factors in its multi-factor mandate seek to
subject the Fed to ongoing political oversight. They cannot settle for a one-time change in
the Fed’s mandate substituting a rigid rule for Fed discretion because such discretion is
needed to give sensible effect to any set of priorities. Instead, these critics aim to rein in
the Fed each time it uses its discretion in ways the critics dislike. The critics want
political actors to be able to require the Fed to make course adjustments that the Fed, in
its discretion, would not otherwise make. In short, although not on its face a challenge to
Fed independence, the claim that the Fed pursues the wrong priorities amounts in practice
to a challenge to such independence.
There are also those who criticize the Fed for failing to adopt a rule-based
monetary policy regime. In monetary theory, this is known as the “rules vs. discretion”
debate.110 One type of rule would tie the value of money to the supply of a commodity or
set of commodities, the most famous version of which is the Gold Standard. But other
rules are possible as well. For example, some economists have long called on the Fed to
increase the money supply by a fixed percentage each year, with the rate determined by a
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simple equation.111 The idea is to prevent the Fed from exercising discretion in setting
monetary policy, because the consequences of the Fed’s overreacting or underreacting are
supposedly worse than not acting at all.
There would thus appear to be two separate questions here. First, should monetary
policy be operated under a fixed set of mechanical rules, or instead should the conduct of
monetary policy be deliberately arranged to require ongoing human judgment in
responding to emerging evidence? Second, if human judgment is going to be part of the
setting of monetary policy, should that human judgment be exercised by politically
insulated human beings, or by more directly politically accountable human beings?
In one sense, then, our enterprise in this article would seem to require us simply to
assume that the answer to the first question is “discretion, not rules,” and then to answer
the second question by saying that such discretion should be exercised by an independent
Fed. Yet that is not in fact our approach. We argue that the first question presents a false
choice. Even if one thinks that monetary policy should be carried out according to rigid
rules, there must be a human element in determining the content of those rules in the first
place, including rules about whether and how the rules can be changed. Those rules can
be set legislatively (that is, by politicians directly), by executive agencies (whose
personnel are appointed and removable by politicians), or by an independent agency
(whose staff are sheltered from direct political control). Our argument, that politically
independent economic specialists should set monetary policy, thus subsumes the rulesversus-discretion question, because we recognize that that debate—although important on
its own terms, as a matter of determining the Fed’s actions on an ongoing basis—falsely
imagines that human judgment can be removed from the establishment and maintenance
over time of a monetary system.
For example, if Congress decided (quite unwisely, in our view) to put the U.S.
back on a gold standard, it might also decide that the only way to change the dollars-togold ratio in the future would be by enacting new legislation; in other words, the goldstandard legislation itself would set the ratio. Or, Congress could decide (much more
wisely, at least given its initial bad decision to adopt a gold standard) to set rules that
anticipate when and by whom the ratio could be altered or even that the gold standard
could be abandoned entirely, for example, during a crisis like 2008. Our argument here is
that, no matter what the background regime might be, there is virtually no rules-based
regime that removes the human ability (and responsibility) to set the rules and to alter the
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rules.112 The best institutional design, in our view, would have politically independent
human beings making judgments about when and how to change the rules.
***
We have seen in this Part that some of the criticisms that have recently been
leveled at the Fed do not challenge the Fed’s independence in the area where
conventional wisdom holds that it needs to be independent of day-to-day political
influence: in the making and implementation of monetary policy. Yet some such
criticisms do pose a challenge in just that area. We think that many of these criticisms are
mistaken as a substantive policy matter, but others will draw different conclusions. If one
is persuaded that Fed independence stands as an obstacle to substantively optimal policy,
one will need a very strong reason for valuing Fed independence more highly than the
substantive policy. Thus, we turn next to asking whether there is a strong justification for
Fed independence.
III.

How the Fed Saved the Economy, and Why It Might Have to Do So Again

The Federal Reserve’s role as an independent central bank necessarily puts it in a
unique position in the U.S. economic and political system. When a crisis emerges, the
Fed’s combination of expertise and political insulation gives it the ability to respond
quickly and with appropriately calibrated strength to prevent matters from getting truly
out of hand, and to guide the financial markets and the economy back toward stability.
The Fed’s recent performance in preventing a complete global economic meltdown is one
of the under-appreciated stories of our time.
Moreover, the Fed’s necessary emergency actions might be needed again in the
not-too-distant future, in a situation that would make it clear that the Fed’s vaunted
independence is essential to solving and preventing self-inflicted damage. Perversely,
however, if the Fed’s actions actually do frustrate the desires of the politicians who might
precipitate such a crisis, the Fed could be required to sign its own political death warrant
in order to rescue the economy. Fortunately, there is a way to save the Fed from having to
make such a fateful choice, as we discuss below.

112

The only possible exception that occurs to us would be an unamendable constitutional provision
setting forth a mechanical rule. Although the initial adoption of such a rule would require the exercise of
human judgment, its subsequent operation would be, in principle at least, automatic. We dismiss this
possibility because even those constitutions that purport to permanently entrench certain features, such as
Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law, do not entrench institutional arrangements regarding monetary
policy. Even purportedly unamendable constitutional provisions, moreover, can be changed by replacing
the constitution.

32

A. The Fed, the Existential Crisis of 2008-09, and the Aftermath
Like most institutions of government, the Federal Reserve is designed to operate
normally during normal times. 113 Its day-to-day activities certainly include vigilantly
scanning the horizon for storms, but most of its resources are quite sensibly devoted to
making sure that the financial system runs smoothly even when no crises are imminent.
Because some serious problems can arise not only from unexpected outside forces (such
as a spike in a vital commodity such as oil due to a war in the Middle East, or a stock
market crisis in a major foreign trading partner like China) but also from imbalances
within the U.S. financial system, the Fed must actively ensure that the financial system is
not developing problems that could suddenly metastasize into full-blown crises. Its
regulatory role, therefore, is in part designed to guarantee that normal day-to-day
operations are held within safe boundaries.
As we noted in our Introduction,114 one might reasonably fault the Fed for failing
to carry out its oversight duties of the financial system during the years leading up to the
2008 global financial crisis. Especially in a low-interest rate environment—which was a
sensible policy posture during that time period, given the continued weakness of the
economy throughout George W. Bush’s presidency—the Fed, at least with the benefit of
20/20 hindsight, should have been much more vigilant about the emergence of problems
that were perhaps inevitable in an economy where housing prices were rising very
rapidly.
As we described in Part I, the fundamental danger in any financial system is that
the banks could experience flash crises known as “runs,” which can destroy not just
individual banks but, through financial contagion effects, also spread to otherwise healthy
financial institutions.115 Although the Fed, in its early years, failed its first big test of
being the “lender of last resort” at the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 (and
continuing for years thereafter), the Fed learned its lesson and subsequently became the
lynchpin of a system that has protected the U.S. financial system from further such
crises. 116 The period between the end of the Great Depression and 2008 was not,
113
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obviously, one of uninterrupted prosperity,117 but it was a period notable for a significant
decrease in the frequency and severity of financial and economic crises, compared to the
decades before the Great Depression.
With hindsight, we now know that the 2000s boom in housing was enabled by the
emergence of a so-called “shadow banking” sector. That is, although the Fed and other
relevant regulators were able to prevent the banks from experiencing the types of runs
that nearly destroyed the economy in the 1930’s, investment banks like Lehman Brothers
and a growing number of hedge funds were engaging in bank-like activities that created a
global market in payment streams from aggregated mortgage debt, which in turn led to
irresponsible lending. Whereas in the earlier period, a conventional local mortgage lender
would typically issue a thirty-year mortgage and then patiently collect monthly payments
for the life of the loan, by the dawn of the new millennium, financial “engineers” had
figured out how to provide all kinds of variations on traditional mortgages, and to offer
them through financial institutions that operated nationwide, with the payment streams
sold to investors worldwide.
Even traditional mortgages were turned into new categories of investment
securities that were then traded on globalized markets, with the buyers of those securities
dependent on the representations of credit rating agencies that the underlying mortgages
were safe and that the risk of default was computed accurately. As a further hedge against
risk, financial institutions began to purchase insurance policies known as credit default
swaps, which essentially were guarantees by other financial institutions that the holders
of such swaps would be made whole if any securities unexpectedly failed to pay off.
This shadow-banking sector was, of course, just as interconnected as traditional
banks have always been. In fact, the connections were more complex, and the aggregate
dollar amounts were in the trillions. These large portfolios were nonetheless deemed safe,
because analysts assessed the risk of default for any particular security as a statistically
independent probability, isolated from the possibility of financial contagion. Or, to put it
more simply, the financial engineers believed that all of the securities that they were
creating were safe, because if one security failed, all of the other securities would still be
there. But it was only a matter of time before some securities would fail, and if the failure
was significant enough, the interconnections between the various financial securities
could start to unravel the system.118
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Again, one can reasonably argue that the Fed should have seen these problems
while they were emerging. Even though there is no obvious way to know when we have
crossed over from a simple bull market to a bubble, the Fed might well have been in a
position to tighten its regulations regarding these formerly unseen financial institutions.
Of course, as we emphasize throughout this article, the Fed does not act in a political
vacuum, and there was a great deal of political pressure preventing the Fed and other
agencies from tamping down these temporarily profitable opportunities. There was
money to be made, and the political branches sided with those whose fortunes were
dependent on a continued hands-off attitude by the Fed and other regulators.
At worst, then, the Fed can be blamed for being unwilling to risk its policy
independence by taking actions that could have raised the ire of Congress and the Bush
administration. Perhaps the Fed, like nearly everyone else at the time, also
underestimated the risks. 119 What is clear, however, is that the Fed not only stepped
forward when the crisis erupted and quite literally saved the economy from collapse, but
it was the only institution that could have done so, both practically and politically.
Once the financial crisis was set in motion by the collapse of Lehman Brothers
and other shocking events, the ensuing financial panic wiped out trillions of dollars of
notional value in the markets. One of the largest insurers of financial products, AIG,
discovered that its business model was based on the flawed idea that not everything could
go bad at the same time. But it could, and it did.
In late 2008, there was serious question whether matters had already gotten so far
out of hand that a second Great Depression was inevitable. As we noted in our
Introduction, the political branches stepped forward with a combination of bailouts that
prominently included the creation of the Troubled-Assets Relief Program (TARP).
TARP, however, was worth only about $700 billion, which was dwarfed by the trillions
of dollars in paper wealth that were hanging in the balance. And because TARP alone
created a political rebellion on the left of the Democratic Party and the right of the
Republican Party, the political response was doomed to be inadequate.120
In that environment, the Fed was clearly the only institution that could be counted
on to act in the interests of saving the system, rather than worrying about misplaced
accusations of “bailing out losers.”121 Moreover, the trillions of dollars necessary to stop
the contagion from spreading farther simply did not exist. Only the Fed, with its unique
ability to create new money when necessary, could do what was needed. As we discussed
in Part II, 122 there are prima facie plausible criticisms of the Fed for exceeding its
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statutory authority in pursuit of these policies, but such technical criticisms ultimately
ignore the very nature of the Fed’s role as lender of last resort.
Moreover, the Fed also knew that it possessed the ability to destroy money, which
it could do if it found that the money that it had created threatened to create inflation. As
it turned out, however, the new money had its desired effect, with none of the bad
possible side effects. Banks and other financial institutions were given sufficient funds to
make it unnecessary to continue to sell off their financial holdings, stopping the
contagion as other asset holders were not forced to sell their assets at fire sale prices. To
the extent that the Fed’s injection of liquidity was inadequate, it was largely because
financial institutions sat on the money the Fed created, acting with newfound extreme
caution to protect their own balance sheets from even the hint of risk. Rather than using
the new money to restore prosperity, therefore, the bailed-out financial institutions simply
held onto safe assets. The Fed had stopped the crisis, but the hope that the private sector
would quickly resume normal activity went unfulfilled.123
In addition to pouring new money into the financial markets to contain the
disaster that inadequate regulation had enabled, the Fed also deployed its key monetary
policy tool to fight the Great Recession. Acting quickly, the Fed lowered its target
interest rate in steps, setting a zero percent target beginning on December 16, 2008.124
The economy remained weak, and continuing to reduce interest rates is the standard
response to a weakened economy. However, interest rates cannot be reduced below zero,
because (other than situations in which people will actually pay a financial institution to
hold their money, in what amounts to purchasing a virtual vault) there is no reason to
deposit money rather than hold onto it, if the payoff is zero either way. Certainly, no one
would give an institution money in exchange for the promise that the institution will
return less money in the future. This is commonly known as the Zero Lower Bound.125
Cutting its target interest rate to zero, therefore, was the most that the Fed could
do, using its standard approach to setting monetary policy. The hope was that the
economy would quickly recover, and that the Fed could then move interest rates into a
range within which it would again be possible to move rates up and down in anticipation
of future fluctuations in the economy. Instead, because the economy has remained so
disappointingly weak for so long,126 as of early 2016, the Fed has only raised interest
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rates once since the onset of the Great Recession (from zero to 0.25 percent, 127 in
December 2015), although it has announced plans for continued increases in the not-toodistant future.128
As we argue in Part IV, the main reason that the Fed has not been able to resume
its historical role of prudently adjusting interest rates to smooth economic fluctuations is
that the president and Congress have agreed to enact perversely contractionary policies
that have slowed the economy’s recovery. Moreover, these misguided fiscal policies have
all but forced the Fed to do what it can to prevent the economy from sliding back into
recession (and another potential financial crisis). The various waves of Quantitative
Easing have seen the Fed redirect its asset purchases in a way that would provide some
forward movement to the economy. Even those economists who support the Fed in these
efforts concede that the positive impacts have been modest, but something is still better
than nothing.129
Disputes about the Fed’s various policy choices aside, however, the important
point here is that the Fed was the only institution in 2008 and 2009 that had the ability to
create money—to be what central banks need to be, which is the lender of last resort. As
it happened, a lot of money needed to be created, given the severity of the immediate
crisis. And the Fed, even knowing that it is constantly in danger of running afoul of the
predispositions of powerful politicians, stepped up and prevented the financial crisis from
become a global depression.
We hope that the Fed will never need to take this kind of action again. At the very
least, we ought to be able to count on our politicians not to create the threat of a crisis that
only the Fed can prevent. As we shall see in sub-Parts B and C, however, there is a very
real possibility that the Fed will be required to prevent a completely avoidable (and
entirely politically inspired) train wreck.

B. The Debt Ceiling and the President’s Options During a Standoff
A longstanding statute known as the “debt ceiling” purports to prevent the level of
federal debt from rising above a specific dollar figure, specified in the statute.130 Prior to
2011, this law was essentially a meaningless bit of feel-good legislation with no practical
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import. Although there had been occasions in previous decades in which the party in
opposition to the then-sitting president would use the occasion of a required increase in
the debt ceiling to offer patriotic speeches about the supposed irresponsibility of allowing
the national debt to continue to increase, pretty much everyone knew that such
grandstanding was meaningless political theater.
The problem was not necessarily that these politicians were insincere in their
statements that they did not want the debt to rise.131 Indeed, as we discuss in Part IV
below, one of the major barriers to sensible policy in the current environment is the belief
among so many politicians that budgetary austerity somehow will heal the economy’s
ills. The larger problem, then, is not that there are politicians who refuse to control the
national debt, but that there are so few politicians who know (or are willing to admit) a
point so basic that it underlay Hamilton’s 1790 Report on the Public Credit, which in turn
laid the foundation for America’s eventual emergence as the world’s largest economy—
that some level of government debt is a virtue, not a vice, so that it would be an
affirmatively bad idea to pay the federal government’s debt down to anywhere near
zero.132
In that sense, then, the status quo ante was an essentially harmless matter of
political theater. Everyone knew that the already-passed spending and taxing laws
required additional borrowing, and the occasional necessity to increase the dollar limit in
the debt ceiling statute afforded everyone the opportunity to blame everyone else for our
supposedly irresponsible fiscal policies. After a few days of speechmaking, the reality
would return that the spending and taxing laws actually had to be executed as written,
which necessarily meant updating the debt ceiling statute.
After the 2010 midterm elections, however, the new Republican majority in the
House of Representatives seized upon a novel political strategy. Rather than simply
conceding that the debt ceiling’s level would need to be adjusted in light of congressional
enactments, the new view was that the president could be accused of “wanting to increase
the debt ceiling.” And because a person who wants something must necessarily pay for it,
the “price” of a debt ceiling increase would be for the president to agree to change one or
more laws in ways that the House majority found appealing, but which they had not been
able to achieve through normal legislative means. Although there was nothing logically
limiting the Republicans’ demands to the realm of fiscal policy—they could, after all,
have refused to increase the debt ceiling unless the president agreed to repeal
environmental laws, or to support abortion restrictions, or anything else that the president
would not otherwise support—in the summer of 2011, the Republican leadership in the
House announced that their party would not increase the debt ceiling without further cuts
131
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in federal spending, even though the House had only weeks before passed a continuing
resolution that included spending cuts, and even though the bill that they passed would,
as a matter of simple arithmetic, still require the debt ceiling to be increased.133
The White House responded to these demands by agreeing to negotiate with
House leaders, narrowly averting a first-ever default on U.S. obligations in early August
2011 only by agreeing to a series of actions that ended in large, new cuts in current and
future spending. In particular, after the failure of a bipartisan “super committee” to agree
on precisely targeted measures, the now-infamous “sequester” went into effect, resulting
in automatic and indiscriminate cuts in domestic and military spending134 that continue to
this day to limit the path of federal spending, even after legislation enacted in 2013 and
2015 to ease the sequester caps somewhat.135
Unsurprisingly, Republicans in Congress viewed their victory in the summer of
2011 as a template for the future. Senator Mitch McConnell, then the minority leader in
the Senate, announced that the debt ceiling would henceforth be a bargaining chip, and
that President Obama should expect to have to give something up if he wanted Congress
to give him the authority to borrow more money. Because the 2011 agreement had
increased the debt ceiling only to a level that would be sufficient for a little more than
two years, given the (decreasing, but still positive) annual budget deficit, the next debt
ceiling political standoff was baked into that legislation.136
Before that next drop-dead date was reached, the authors of the current article
wrote a series of articles in which we argued that the president would be justified in
announcing that the debt ceiling statute is unconstitutional, and that he would therefore
refuse to allow the debt ceiling to prevent him from carrying out his duties under the
spending and revenue laws.137 We coined the term “trilemma” to describe the president’s
impossible position, should Congress refuse to increase the debt ceiling. If federal debt
reached the statutory ceiling at any given time, and the difference between legislated
expenditures and tax revenues was, say, $50 billion, then the President would be required
either to: (1) collect $50 billion more in taxes than Congress had (via the Internal
Revenue Code) ordered him to collect; (2) spend $50 billion less than Congress had (via
the appropriations laws) ordered him to spend; or (3) borrow $50 billion more than
Congress had (via the debt ceiling statute) authorized him to borrow.
Because each prong of the trilemma would require the President to usurp an
enumerated power of Congress, any path that the President chose would violate the
Constitution. We argued, however, that it was possible to rank the three unconstitutional
choices, and we concluded that the president would do the least constitutional damage by
133
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honoring Congress’s commands regarding spending and taxing, which he could only do
by setting aside Congress’s contradictory command regarding debt. If Congress disagreed
with the president’s choice to borrow the necessary amount of money to avoid a default
on the government’s obligations, it retained the power to change future spending and tax
levels to achieve the level of debt that it desired.
The conventional wisdom in policy circles holds that faced with a shortfall caused
by reaching the debt ceiling limit, the president ought to unilaterally withhold payment on
spending obligations as they come due, but we argued (and still contend) that this
conventional wisdom is wrong. For the president to arrogate to himself the power to
change Congress’s spending priorities—honoring some of Congress’s expressed wishes
while frustrating others—would undo so much of the legislative branch’s negotiated
compromises that the constitutional structure cannot permit it. As now-Chief Justice
Roberts once wrote: “Separation of powers is a zero-sum game. If one branch
unconstitutionally aggrandizes itself, it is at the expense of the other branches.”138 The
degree of executive aggrandizement that would follow from a president’s decision to reset Congress’s spending priorities is simply too great, compared to the alternatives. The
president should not be allowed or expected to use the debt ceiling statute as a reason to
ignore Congress’s hard-fought budgetary compromises, and instead to decide which bills
to pay and which to ignore or delay.
Notwithstanding our analysis, the White House has endorsed the conventional
wisdom that the president would have no choice but to usurp Congress’s spending power
by refusing to make required payments to the government’s obligees, if Congress ever
fails to make a timely adjustment in the debt ceiling.139 This decision might well be based
on savvy political strategizing. For example, the White House might fear that the
president could be accused of “wanting to borrow money,” or that he has “blown through
the debt ceiling,” or similar baseless—but potentially potent—political attacks. Whatever
the political reasons, however, there is no evidence that the Obama administration was
ever seriously contemplating following our advice.
President Obama did, however, change his political strategy after losing his first
debt ceiling battle, in the summer of 2011. Rather than accepting the idea that an increase
in the debt ceiling was a desirable goal in itself, for which he had to pay a political price,
he pointed out (correctly) that the debt ceiling must be increased simply in order to
prevent the federal government from defaulting on obligations to which it was already
legally committed. To be able to “pay our bills,” the president took the position that the
debt ceiling was non-negotiable. Neither side wanted to increase the debt ceiling, as a
matter of policy commitments, but both sides were responsible for increasing it to the
level that would be required to allow the nation’s obligations to be met. The president
thus drew a line in the sand, saying that he would accept only a “clean” debt ceiling
increase, and that he would not negotiate over unrelated issues in order to adjust the
nominal limit in the debt ceiling statute. 140
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As far as it went, the president’s revised approach was clearly correct. The debt
ceiling statute is simply not relevant to determining how much debt the government
issues. Members of Congress who (wrongly, in our view) think that the deficit should be
zero, or who even believe that the debt should be paid down (which would require annual
surpluses, probably for decades to come) have the legislative means necessary to make
that happen, through the normal budgetary process. The debt ceiling is thus not about
changing the amount of debt, but about making it impossible to finance the debt that
Congress has already put in place.
As we argued in our most recent article, once there are spending and taxing laws
in place that imply the need for deficit financing, the government will have to take on that
new debt by issuing formal Treasury securities, or it will instead borrow the money
without calling it debt, by telling its obligees that they must wait to be paid. Either way,
once the spending and taxing laws have been passed, the die is cast, and the debt will rise
above the level specified in the debt ceiling statute, whether Republicans in Congress
admit it or not. The only way around this conclusion, we noted, would be for the
President to take the radical (and unconstitutional, even on the narrowest reading of the
relevant provisions) step of repudiating its obligations outright.141
In that sense, then, the president was correct to say that Congress has no choice
under the Constitution but to increase the debt ceiling when appropriate (or, even better,
to repeal the debt ceiling statute entirely), and to stop trying to use that law as a political
battering ram.
In addition, as a matter of political strategy, one could understand why the
president would loudly announce his new commitment not to sign a bill raising the debt
ceiling if it includes any other provisions. As in the deadly game of “chicken,” such a
“stare-down strategy,” as we call it, can only work if the other side knows in advance that
the president is fully committed in advance to staying the course. The congressional
Republicans’ only choice at that point is to test the president’s level of commitment. As it
happens, President Obama’s opponents did indeed blink each time that a debt ceiling
increase has been required in the post-2011 era, agreeing each time to increase the debt
ceiling (or, in some cases, to “suspend” the debt ceiling temporarily, and then re-set the
limit to a higher level when the ceiling is later reinstated) and thus avoid a default on the
government’s obligations. In that sense, the President “won” the post-2011 debt ceiling
standoffs. However, there is no guarantee that his successor will prevail in future
standoffs, the first of which could occur in early 2017, when the debt ceiling will next
need to be raised.142 Ominously, in February 2016, House Republicans released a report
that strongly suggests that they continue to think that failure to raise the debt ceiling
would impose no special hardship—and certainly no constitutional crisis—for the
executive branch: they apparently regard the stare-down strategy as a bluff that they are
now prepared to call.143
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Thus, there was and continues to be an enormous danger inherent in the staredown strategy. Imagine that the next president secretly agrees with our analysis, and thus
that she would be willing—if Congress ultimately refuses to blink during a future staredown—to issue new debt in order to honor Congress’s dictates regarding spending and
taxing. At what point would the president be able to announce that she is going to issue
new debt? Announcing her fallback strategy before the very last second would allow
opponents in Congress to blame her in exactly the way that she would hope not to be
blamed, which would supposedly weaken her in the competition for public approval (and
of finger pointing). Meanwhile, the stare-down strategy’s likelihood of working is at its
highest as the clock ticks toward midnight on the drop-dead date, as congressional
opponents become convinced that the president will refuse to blink.
Yet waiting until the witching hour to announce the issuance of debt-ceilingviolating debt would create serious technical implementation issues. Normally, the sale of
new debt securities in a standard bond auction (which is the method by which the federal
government borrows money) is announced weeks in advance, and the process plays out
over hours or days. If the president is strategically committed to waiting until the last
possible second, however, she would be unable to authorize the necessary auction in time
to prevent a default. The federal government must pay bills that come due every day, and
if sufficient tax revenues do not come in on that day, abiding by the debt ceiling would
leave the Treasury with no way to pay the people to whom the government owes money.
On the drop-dead date, bills would come due that could only be paid by borrowing
money; yet the money would not yet have been borrowed, and it would be logistically
impossible to hold a timely bond auction.
Importantly, when we describe such an event as a “first-ever” default on the
government’s obligations, we also mean to emphasize the gravity of such an
unprecedented event. The U.S. government is considered the safest borrower in the
world, and its reputation for sound finances is based on the fact that no one has ever been
denied payment in full on the date that the federal government has legally committed to
making a payment. The United States has never said, “sorry, I’ll get it to you in a few
days.” People and businesses to which the government owes money count on timely and
complete payments, and they make further commitments on that basis. Missing payments
by even a day is no small matter.
In short, the stakes in a debt ceiling stare-down are incalculably high. The federal
government’s future ability to borrow, to enter into contracts, and its very ability to
continue to conduct its affairs in a businesslike fashion would be harmed by any failure to
pay its obligations. That is not to say that people would henceforth refuse to do business
with the government, or to lend it money, but just like any other borrower with a
tarnished credit rating, the government would see its future borrowing costs rise. And the
shame of it is that these increased costs to be borne by taxpayers are completely
avoidable.
Therefore, the danger of a presidential debt ceiling stare-down strategy is that, if
neither side blinks, it would be too late for the president to adopt a new strategy that
would both minimize the constitutional violation and save the nation’s creditworthiness.
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Fortunately, there is one way out. Unfortunately, the consequences of relying on the
needed deus ex machina would be extraordinarily high.

C. The Dangers of Requiring the Fed to Use Its Full Powers
As we described above, the Federal Reserve’s most important duty is to protect
the financial markets, and ultimately the economy. Usually, this means that it must act as
the lender of last resort for financial institutions, as we described in sub-Part A, above.
Here, however, we see the possibility that the Fed could be the only lender that could act
quickly enough to prevent the debt ceiling from creating a default on some of the
government’s obligations.
The Fed’s concern in this instance would not only be based on the idea that the
government’s future borrowing costs would rise in the aftermath of a default. The Fed
would also be required to consider the immediate effects on financial markets, if the
United States were to default on any of its legally required payments between the
expiration of the deadline to raise the debt ceiling and when a sale on the open market of
what we have previously called “Presidential bonds” could be implemented. 144 Even
assuming that banks, foreign governments, and other financial players could eventually
be found to buy the bonds (at an appropriate interest premium reflecting the cloud on
their legality), such purchases would come too late to avoid default. In the meantime,
financial actors, both at home and abroad, would likely respond to the initial default by
taking protective measures, reducing their exposure and thus cutting off financial
transactions that they would otherwise have been quite willing to consummate. The risk
of financial contagion would be quite real.
In these circumstances, the Fed might well decide that it should intervene and
immediately buy the new bonds itself. It would need to purchase enough Treasury
securities—at midnight on the drop-dead date—to allow the federal government to avoid
its first-ever default. For these purposes, the Fed’s independent status is key, because it
counts as “the public” when it buys securities from the Treasury. Although it would be
buying those securities—that is, lending to the government—with money that it created
of its own volition, that would not be extraordinary, and there is nothing about the Fed’s
actions here that would be any different from any other time that it indirectly increases
the money supply (such as its standard approach to lowering interest rates in the face of a
weak economy). The important point is that the Treasury would receive the money that it
needs to pay all of its obligees, in full and on time.
Here, of course, the Fed would know that there are no good choices. The markets
would be in some amount of turmoil in any event, and the Fed’s intervention would itself
create uncertainty (and no small amount of acrimony). However, because the Fed is the
only institution that would be capable of acting fast enough and decisively enough to
prevent the country from permanently damaging its credit rating, we would expect the
politically independent Fed to step in to save the day, and to save the nation from the
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irresponsible actions of those politicians who would have tried to use an unconstitutional
statute to achieve political ends that they cannot otherwise achieve.
Indeed, we believe that the Fed would be required to buy the Treasury’s new
bonds in such a situation, in order to meet its primary responsibility of protecting the
stability of the financial markets. But even if we are wrong, and the people who are then
in charge of the Fed choose not to intervene, that would merely mean that they have
concluded that the consequences of a first-ever default are outweighed by other
considerations. Having an institution in place that possesses the political independence
that would allow it at least to consider following our advice—rather than being subject to
political supervision—is precisely why we believe that the Fed’s independence is so
important in a crisis. It might not always make the tough calls that other people might
want it to make, but it would nonetheless be empowered to act on its best judgment.
Note, however, that even if the Fed were to follow our advice, the debt limit
would still have been breached, precisely because the Fed counts as “the public” when it
lends money to the government, and it would be holding more Treasury securities than it
held before, increasing the total outstanding debt above the statutory limit. Nonetheless,
as we noted above, that ship would have sailed when Congress enacted spending and
taxing laws that imply borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling. The president would still
have faced a trilemma, and she would thus violate the Constitution’s separation of powers
by authorizing the Treasury Department to borrow money from the Fed. As we have
emphasized, however, because this is the least unconstitutional of the president’s three
options, it is the least bad choice from a set of only bad options. And at the point where it
became clear that the stare-down strategy had resulted in a stalemate, the Fed would be
the only institution that could allow the president to come close to meeting her
constitutional obligations—and, of course, to minimizing the damage to the financial
system and the economy.
Even so, if the Fed were to follow our advice, it would open itself up to charges
that it had taken sides with the president in a partisan fight. Even though it would not
have made its decision for political reasons, it would have been forced to choose to anger
either Republicans or Democrats. And this is no small matter. As we described in Part II,
the Fed is already under constant attack for its activities, with “end the Fed” and “audit
the Fed” efforts now afoot in Congress, as the latest incarnations of the undying distrust
of central banks that seems always to exist just outside the political mainstream.
Here, the action that the Fed would be obligated to take—buying bonds that have
not been authorized by Congress in order to prevent a federal default—would not only
stoke the fears of “unaccountable” bankers working behind the scenes, but would also
feed into one of the central complaints on the political right: that the Fed is “enabling the
growth of the federal debt.”145 As noted above, the Fed carries out its mandate to control
interest rates and monetary aggregates by buying and selling Treasury securities. It would
be possible for the Fed instead to buy private financial assets such as corporate stocks and
bonds, but it is difficult to imagine that this would make the Fed’s populist critics feel
any better. After all, do they really want the Fed to hold ownership stakes in corporate
America, or to be a creditor to American businesses?
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In any event, the current reality is that the Fed pushes new money into the
financial system by buying and holding U.S. Treasury securities. This, in turn, can easily
be mischaracterized as “fund[ing] Washington’s deficit spending.”146 Even though the
debt ceiling itself has nothing to do with the growth of the debt, the superficial logic
would go something like this: The Fed already finances the debt. The Democrats want
more debt. The debt ceiling would stop them from issuing it. The president is refusing to
negotiate to reduce spending and thus reduce the debt. The Fed has just proved that it is
on the president’s side by allowing her to illegally ignore the debt ceiling.
This possibility suggests that the Fed could have to choose between following its
best judgment and maintaining its political independence. The Fed might well agree with
us that the best measure to take, should Congress insist on creating a trilemma for the
president, is to buy the new Treasury securities that would be issued on the drop-dead
date. Yet it would have to weigh against that policy judgment the possibility that it could
be signing its own death warrant, because enraged opponents could seize on its actions to
justify legislation curtailing Fed independence or eliminating the Fed entirely.
In short, the possibility that some members of Congress will again force a debtceiling showdown, combined with the decision of a future president to use a stare-down
strategy, could result in a crisis that is in some sense tailor-made for an independent
central bank to step in and solve. Yet the result of such a situation could be either that the
Fed does the right thing at the expense of its own independence, or that it does the wrong
thing to protect that independence. Given the stakes, and the importance of the Fed in
serving as an independent but accountable institution, it would be better if the Fed were
never to face such a choice.
We are aware, of course, that in some sense our analysis here could be used as a
roadmap to guarantee the Fed’s destruction. For someone who is determined to “end the
Fed,” after all, we have described how a deliberately concocted debt-ceiling crisis could
not only serve the purpose of putting the president in a political bind, but it could also set
in motion the Fed’s final demise. We have no doubt that there are those who would be
willing to bet the country’s future and roll the dice (although we dearly hope that there
are not enough of those people actually to make it happen). Even so, we do not view our
roll as analyzing an issue but then hiding unwelcome conclusions. Moreover, our analysis
here shows even more clearly why a president’s decision to adopt a stare-down strategy,
rather than confronting well in advance of a debt ceiling standoff the reality that the debt
ceiling statute is unconstitutional, is such a dangerous game.
Beyond the cautionary tale that comes from this possible series of events, the
larger issue is whether the Fed should continue to exist as an independent policy actor.
This really boils down to the question of whether we want the Fed to be able to exercise
human judgment. Although we would never want the Fed to be forced to decide whether
to rescue the economy during a debt ceiling standoff, that it could do so serves as an
important example demonstrating the unique role that the Fed serves in the U.S. political
and economic system. It is precisely when the political branches are incapable of
responding to a crisis—either because of the rush of events, or because the political
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process has ground to a halt—that we would most need a politically independent Fed to
do what otherwise could not be done.
IV. Justifying Fed Independence
We have just seen the value of Fed independence in a crisis—both a recent real
one and a potential near-future one. Yet the Fed acts as an independent agency in normal
times as well during crises. Can Fed independence be justified in normal times?
In our view, during the years since the financial crisis the Fed made better
macroeconomic policy choices than the political branches did. Whereas the latter
deployed expansionary fiscal policy too timidly during the crisis and then pivoted to
deficit reduction well before the economy had fully recovered, the Fed pursued an
aggressive, expansionary monetary policy.147 Yet the fact that an expert agency pursues
better policies than those pursued by political actors is not, standing alone, a sufficient
reason to insulate that agency from political supervision. If it were, then we would have
reasons to favor technocracy presumptively across a wide range of subject matter areas.
Accordingly, the case for Fed independence in ordinary times must rest on
something beyond the superior economic competence of Fed economists relative to
elected officials. Conventionally, that something is thought to be the risk that, if given
control over monetary policy, elected officials—especially the president—will use that
control to boost the economy in the short term so that the voters reward them, even as the
best approach for the long-term health of the economy would be tighter money. Yet the
experience of recent years reverses the conventional wisdom. More commonly now,
elected officials favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed. 148 The conventional
justification for Fed independence in normal times appears to be out of date.
This Part nonetheless defends Fed independence by emphasizing that times
change. No one thinks that Americans’ generally healthy regard for freedom of speech
justifies eliminating the First Amendment, so, likewise, the fact that we live in a period
when the roles of the Fed and political actors are upside-down does not mean that the
traditional relation will not reappear. A structural defense of institutional independence
should be based on the long-term incentives of the actors. In elaborating this point, we
draw on an analogy between an independent judiciary and an independent central bank.
We also emphasize a distinctive justification for Fed independence based on our
consideration of the Fed’s performance in recent years and its potential role in responding
to future crises.149 Fed independence from the political branches of the government does
not merely enable the Fed to check them or to act on its own. Rather, Fed independence
facilitates cooperation with the rest of the government because the Fed can act as a
financial counter-party to the political parts of the government (especially Treasury), in
both normal times and emergency times.
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A. From Expertise to Self-Dealing
In an important speech two decades ago, administrative law scholar Peter Strauss
explained how, over time, the chief rationale for delegation of substantial power to
administrative agencies shifted from expertise—the notion that complex technical
questions call for solutions fashioned by objective experts—to politics—the recognition
that agencies make policy choices constrained by public input and presidential
supervision.150 The leading administrative law doctrine of our era, Chevron deference,
reflects that shift: In the eponymous case, the Supreme Court sustained the Reagan
administration’s loosening of the emissions rules governing power plants on the ground
that, within the broad linguistic bounds of the relevant statutory delegation, an agency
may (indeed must) make policy choices, but that ultimate supervision by the president
ensures political accountability for those choices.151
To be sure, comparative expertise continues to play a role in justifying delegation
to administrative agencies. When Congress paints with a broad brush, the case law
assumes that, other things being equal, it intends that agency experts rather than
generalist judges will fill in the details.152
In addition, recent scholarship calls attention to an institutional dimension to
agency expertise. In the traditional picture, courts (and others) would give epistemic
deference to experts because, in virtue of their training and experience, they know more
about the underlying technical issues than the layperson. The new work on agency
expertise supplements this view of expertise “in the air” by describing how specialized
training and experience interact with a particular institutional setting. As Matthew
Stephenson helpfully summarizes this perspective using what he himself calls “the jargon
of modern social science, public decision makers’ expertise about policy decisions is
often endogenous (produced by factors internal to the legal-institutional system) rather
than exogenous (determined by factors external to, and therefore independent of, legalinstitutional design choices).”153 In other words, agencies do not merely collect experts
under one roof where they exercise their pre-existing expertise; the agency and its
professional staff co-produce expertise.
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This new attention to how agencies produce and exercise expertise arguably
justifies restoring some of the lost luster of expertise as a justification for both delegation
of authority to agencies and judicial deference to agency decision making. At the same
time, however, the factors that Strauss identified as leading to the earlier shift from
expertise to politics have hardly disappeared. Agencies remain susceptible to capture by
the industries they regulate,154 and many decisions delegated to agencies involve trading
off values that are matters of political contestation. Perhaps the most that can be said is
that the case for delegation and deference to agencies rests on an uncertain and contextdependent mix of expertise and politics.
We take no position on the precise proportions of that mix in any given setting or
more broadly. Our point here is that, whatever the mix in any particular context,
something extra must be offered to justify structuring an agency to be relatively
independent of political oversight. In principle, that something could be the
extraordinarily technical nature of the underlying subject matter, but in practice, that sort
of justification cannot explain the haphazard pattern of supervision that Congress has in
fact devised. Indeed, there is not even agreement on which agencies count as
independent155 or whether one can sensibly draw a sharp distinction between independent
and executive-branch agencies.156
But even treating “independence” as a matter of degree rather than kind, it is plain
that the degree to which the relevant regulatory subject matter calls for technical skill
cannot, by itself, explain why Congress chooses to make some agencies more or less
politically accountable. For example, environmental regulation requires extraordinarily
complex scientific judgments; yet the Administrator and deputy Administrators of the
Environmental Protection Agency are political appointees heading an agency within the
executive branch.157 Likewise, the Energy Department, which has responsibility for many
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highly technical matters, 158 is an executive agency. At the same time, however, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have
the usual indicia of independent agencies.159
Thus, the technical skill needed to regulate an area cannot have been the decisive
criterion in Congress’s decisions whether to make particular agencies subject to direct
political control versus relatively independent. And accordingly, the need for technical
expertise does not provide a sufficient explanation for the Fed’s independence. Yes,
regulation of the macro-economy through the purchase and sale of financial assets
requires considerable technical expertise, but certainly not more technical expertise than
the sorts of tasks undertaken by some more politically accountable agencies.
In any event, strictly as a normative matter, the need for expertise should not
suffice as a reason for an agency’s independence from political oversight. To justify
creating an independent agency, Congress should have some special reason beyond
subject matter difficulty. Otherwise, given the complexity of just about everything,
Congress would be justified in delegating nearly all regulation to independent agencies.
We recognize that virtually no body of constitutional doctrine governs the
question of when Congress can, and when it cannot, delegate power to an independent as
opposed to an executive-branch agency. The issue arises, if at all, only indirectly,
typically in cases challenging congressional restrictions on the president’s power to
remove officers wielding government power.160 Yet those cases make no serious effort to
distinguish between the sorts of business that can be assigned to agency officials who are
relatively insulated from political pressure and those that must be entrusted to officials
directly answerable to the president.161
Accordingly, when we ask whether Fed independence can be justified, we do not
mean to inquire whether Fed independence is constitutionally permissible. Under the
current doctrine, the answer to that question is pretty clearly yes. Perhaps the doctrine
ought to be modified so that, in Gillian Metzger’s turn of phrase, the president has a
“duty to supervise” the administrative state.162 If so, that duty might be calibrated to take
account of the particular mission and characteristics of each of the various agencies of
government.
For present purposes, however, our task is sufficiently complicated even when we
employ the simplifying assumption that there are just two kinds of agencies: executive
agencies that answer to the president and independent agencies that are less directly
accountable to political oversight. Any plausible classificatory scheme would put the Fed
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in the second category. Accordingly, when we ask whether Fed independence is justified
we mean simply whether Congress had a good reason for thinking that the Fed needs the
kind of independence it enjoys163—that is, whether the Fed is special in some way. This
is why, in order to avoid the slippery slope to technocracy tout court, a good answer
would have to point to something other than the expertise of Fed economists.
The standard answer in the literature on the Fed (and central banks more
generally) is the risk that politicians will manipulate the money supply for short-term
political ends at the expense of long-term economic health.164 In the United States, the
clearest example is the pressure that President Richard Nixon applied to Fed Chair Arthur
Burns. 165 That Nixon was able to apply such pressure notwithstanding the Fed’s
institutional insulation only underscores the danger we would face if the Fed were subject
to direct political control.
The next sub-Part raises questions about the continuing vitality of this
justification for Fed independence, but for now we note that it bears a strong structural
resemblance to the standard justification for an independent judiciary with the power of
judicial review. Constitutions mark the boundaries of government’s authority—whether
at the border of other branches or levels of government or of individual rights—and so
there is a risk of self-dealing if the very government officials whose actions a constitution
constrains have final authority over the meaning of the constitution. That risk is perhaps
least tolerable when, in John Hart Ely’s memorable phrase, “the ins are choking off the
channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”166
Ely’s justificatory account of judicial review by an independent judiciary
translates to the Fed quite tightly. If left to their own devices, incumbent presidents—the
ins—will use the levers of monetary policy to stay in and to keep challengers out. The
worry also applies to a second-term president, who would be tempted to froth up the
economy in the hope of aiding in the election of a successor from the same political
party.
In at least one way, Ely’s worry about the ins favoring their political interests over
the interests of the public in general carries even greater urgency with respect to
monetary policy by the Fed than with respect to judicial review by an independent
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judiciary. Politicians unconstrained by Ely-style representation-reinforcing judicial
review will have incentives to rig the political process to give themselves an electoral
advantage. Consequently, any policy chosen by the resulting unrepresentative
government officials can be said to be bad on process grounds, but the rigging of the
system will not systematically lead to substantively bad policy. By contrast, the rigging
of monetary policy to benefit incumbents will not only distort electoral results, but will
also systematically yield bad policy outcomes because it will bias monetary policy in
favor of loose credit, even when tighter credit would be the preferable course on strictly
economic grounds. These two concerns—the risk of self-dealing and the tendency of
such self-dealing to lead to bad monetary policy—together provide the something extra
that we have said is needed to justify Fed independence.
To be sure, “self dealing” is a relative term. In some sense anything the
government does carries a risk of some sort of self dealing. For example, if the
government borrows irresponsibly to fund short-term consumption rather than long-term
investment, that choice can benefit incumbents, because only the satiated consumers of
the here and now vote in the next election. Or the president (with or without
congressional authorization or acquiescence) can wage an unnecessary war to create a
rally-round-the flag effect that benefits her or her party in the next election, while
imposing future costs on service members, their families, taxpayers, and the general
public whose security may be undermined by later blowback.
Nonetheless, the risks of self dealing with respect to monetary policy are
sufficiently different in degree from some other risks of self dealing to warrant treating
them as different in kind. The irresponsible use of monetary policy poses a risk of
catastrophic harm, as the history of countries that have experienced hyper-inflation
confirms. Most other sorts of self dealing—such as pork barrel spending—may be
wasteful and foolish, but do not risk catastrophe.
To be sure, there are risks of catastrophic harm in some other domains. To stick
with the clearest example, the use of military force may pose the risk of escalation to
nuclear war. The decision to abandon policies favoring alternative energy and instead to
tap some potent carbon-based resource could tip the balance towards irreversible and
catastrophic climate change. Accordingly, if we were designing American public
institutions from scratch, we might conclude that one or more of the agencies responsible
for policy in these areas ought to be insulated from direct political control as well. An
“independent military” is certainly a conceptual possibility.167
However, we are not designing our institutions from scratch. The Commander-inChief clause of the Constitution we have plainly requires that the military be subject to
direct presidential control. Moreover, even if the Constitution did not rule out an
independent military, the risk of catastrophic harm from self dealing by political actors in
the military context must be weighed against other risks. A military not subject to direct
political control could increase the risk of a coup d’état. Even apart from that risk, on the
whole, political accountability of the military may actually reduce the risk of catastrophic
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harm. The Framers’ distrust of standing armies168 and the decision to give Congress a
role in the decision to go to war—together with the Kantian observation that democracies
rarely go to war, at least against each other 169 —provide reasons to think that an
independent military would be, on net, harmful.
Meanwhile and conversely, there is yet another reason for thinking that monetary
policy in the hands of directly politically accountable actors would be especially
vulnerable to the risk of self dealing. More than almost any other policy area with
systemic effects, monetary policy is opaque to ordinary Americans. If a president “wags
the dog” by engaging in politically motivated war, or Congress promotes the coal
industry, what is happening will be clear enough to anyone paying attention. By contrast,
manipulation of monetary policy can often fly under the public’s radar, especially given
the diversity of opinion about where interest rates should be set at any particular moment.
In any event, it is not our aim here to show that monetary policy is uniquely suited
for an independent agency. If the sorts of factors we have identified that justify
independence for the Fed (or other relevant factors) justify the conclusion that, all things
considered, some other agencies also ought to be insulated from direct political control,
so be it. Our claim is simply that something extra should justify independence for any
agency, and that the Fed, more than many agencies operating in other policy areas,
satisfies that requirement, because of the special risks of self dealing involved in
monetary policy if conducted by politicians or people directly accountable to politicians.
Indeed, far from justifying too many independent agencies, our requirement of a
special justification for making an agency independent might prove problematic for many
of the existing independent agencies. Independence for some agencies perhaps could be
justified on the ground that they address acute versions of the self-dealing concern. For
others, one might enlist other sorts of reasons, some of which might also apply to the Fed
itself. For example, independent agencies often include representatives from the private
sector in order to attain some of the advantages of industry self-regulation.170 To render
an agency answerable to the private sector, even in part, is necessarily to render it
relatively independent of political control. But whether this or some other sort of
justification can be found for every independent agency is beyond the scope of this
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Article. 171 Our focus is on the Fed, for which the self-dealing rationale apparently
suffices.
B. Pathology and Spandrels
Or does it? Perhaps the standard justification for Fed independence is passé. No
longer do we see the Fed fighting to maintain the integrity of the currency against a set of
profligate political actors seeking to add temporary froth to the economy in order to boost
their standing with the electorate. Instead, as we have noted, the current pattern is just the
opposite: The political system favors tighter monetary policy than the Fed. Does this role
reversal mean that Fed independence can no longer be justified?
We think the answer is no, for there is no reason to think that the political
branches’ current endorsement of monetary (and fiscal) austerity as the path to prosperity
is permanent. Institutions like a central bank should be designed with an eye towards the
long term, and over the long term the incentives of political actors could once again
unduly bias them towards short-term easy money timed to the political cycle at the
expense of long-term growth.
Once again, constitutional law provides a useful analogy. In an important article
three decades ago, Vincent Blasi argued that in interpreting the First Amendment courts
ought to be guided by what he called
the pathological perspective. That is, the overriding objective at all times
should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those
historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent
and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be targeted
for the worst of times.172
Blasi explained that even though pathological periods tend to be short-lived, they can do
lasting damage, and that the body of free speech doctrine therefore ought to be designed,
even in ordinary times, with pathological periods in mind.173 Blasi was not so naïve as to
believe that judicial adoption of the pathological perspective would utterly prevent
pathological periods, but he thought that conscious adoption of the pathological
perspective during ordinary times “might help to blunt or delay the impact of
some pathological pressures, keep a pathology in certain bounds, or stimulate the
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regenerative forces that permit a political community to work its way out of
a pathological period.”174
It is at least arguable that U.S. free speech doctrine—which is stronger relative to
other governmental objectives than free speech protection in any other country—already
incorporates something like a pathological perspective. Yet, as Geoffrey Stone has
shown, the courts have been powerless to prevent, and have often acquiesced in,
unnecessary curtailments of civil liberties when the nation felt threatened.175 To be sure,
many of the episodes Stone details pre-dated modern free speech doctrine, although the
post-9/11 measures did not.
In any event, for our current purposes, we do not need to take a position on
whether matters would have been still worse had the courts not adopted the pathological
perspective in the First Amendment area or, more broadly, whether Blasi’s prescription is
sound in its own domain. At the very least, there is a logic to Blasi’s argument that could
be true in any given domain. And that logic translates quite well to monetary policy.
Whereas Blasi offered the pathological perspective as an attitude for judges
construing the First Amendment, legislators and constitution writers can also take the
pathological perspective in designing institutions. Indeed, one might think of a judicially
enforceable bill of rights as the product of constitution writers (or amenders) who have
taken the pathological perspective. The sort of polity likely to produce a bill of rights that
is meant to be taken seriously (by contrast with the rights protections one sees in sham
constitutions176) will generally be one that, in normal times, is inclined to respect rights
even without the bill of rights. Although Justice Scalia surely overstated the point when
he averred that the whole point of a bill of rights is to fortify a society’s deep
commitments against the possibility that those commitments may be cast aside in a future
crisis,177 that is certainly part of what a bill of rights does.178
The same sort of argument justifies Fed independence even in an era when the
political branches favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed does. So long as politicians
can manipulate the money supply to favor their short-term interests at the expense of the
economy’s long-term health, an institutional designer who takes the pathological
perspective will seek to insulate the central bank from direct political oversight, so as to
minimize that risk. Just as Blasi noted that robust pathologically-oriented free speech
doctrine will not be sufficient to prevent all overreactions against civil liberties, so too, an
independent Fed will not stand up to all political pressure, as the Nixon/Burns episode
illustrates. But just as the pathological perspective on free speech can nonetheless be
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defended on the ground that it may reduce the likelihood and severity of periods of
unwarranted invasions of civil liberties, so taking the pathological perspective by
designing an independent Fed can be justified on the ground that it reduces the likelihood
of political actors bullying the Fed into unwisely increasing the money supply when the
best long-term economic analysis would call for a tight monetary policy.
We would add, moreover, that our concern about self-dealing—with preventing
the “ins” from abusing policymaking power to stay in office and to oust their opponents
from the offices that the more powerful “ins” currently do not hold—also justifies a
concern that politicians could manipulate monetary policy toward inappropriate
tightening, as well as easing. As we described above, the classic concern is that
incumbents will pump up the economy in order to win elections, but it is in fact possible
that politicians could instead decide to strangle the economy as a short-term political
maneuver.
Why would a politician want to harm the economy? A long line of political
science research has found that, at least in the United States and Britain, the incumbent
party’s electoral fate is all but sealed by the direction that the economy is taking in the
months immediately preceding the election.179 That is, it is not a question of whether
times are good or bad, but whether the economy is getting better or worse before an
election. This means that a savvy politician could decide to manufacture a recession early
in her term, in order to set the stage for the economy to experience a robust recovery as
the next election looms.
President Carter, in fact, was criticized for political naiveté, by essentially running this
strategy in reverse. He nominated a Fed chairman in 1979, Paul Volcker, who
immediately instituted severe monetary contraction, which meant that Carter and his
party faced the electorate in 1980 while presiding over a weakening economy.180
We take no position on whether this reductionist view of economic cause and
political effect is true or false. Instead, we simply note that some incumbents could
believe that it is true, and if those politicians had the ability to control or unduly influence
monetary policy, they would have the means and motive to use contractionary monetary
policy for political ends, in much the same way that one would usually worry about the
inappropriate use of expansionary monetary policy.
Furthermore, the existence of divided government (that is, of one party
controlling the presidency, while the other party controls one or both houses of Congress)
raises the possibility that one party or the other could exploit a non-independent monetary
policy to manufacture pre-election downturns as well as upturns.181 For example, in late
179

See Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al, The Compleat Economic Voter: New Theory and British Evidence,
43(2) BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 241 (Apr. 2013); RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND
OTHER THINGS (2d ed. 2011); Robert S. Erikson, Economic Conditions and The Presidential Vote, 83(2)
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (Jun. 1989); Gregory B. Markus, The Impact of Personal and National Economic
Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis, 32(1) AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 137
(1988).
180
Ann Mari May, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and the Carter Presidency, 23(4) PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q’LY 699, 708 (1993) (describing the “massive contraction” in “late 1979 and early 1980” due to
Fed policy, which only turned expansionary in mid-1980, when it was too late to have much effect in time
for the presidential election).
181
The party that believed its opponents would be blamed for a weakening economy would have a
motive to favor monetary contraction. Usually, the fate of the president’s party is thought to depend on the
economy, which would give the other party’s congressional leaders reason to sink the economy. Where that

55

2010, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell famously said: “The single most important
thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president.”182 There is
some controversy over whether McConnell was saying baldly that he would oppose the
president no matter what, or instead that he merely meant to say that enacting the
Republicans’ substantive agenda was contingent on Obama’s losing his reelection bid in
2012. 183 Even on the more generous reading, however, the point is that McConnell
wanted Obama to lose the next election. And if monetary policy had been under
congressional control—even as a matter of creating stasis, as the Republicans succeeded
in doing with regard to fiscal policy after 2010—the danger would have existed that
monetary policy would also have been used to generate an unfavorable political
environment for the president in 2012.
Even in a world where the politicians currently favor tighter monetary policy than
the Fed does, therefore, they could abuse non-independent monetary policymaking as a
way to manipulate political outcomes. Although we view the pathological perspective as
sufficient to justify an independent Fed even in an age of austerity, we also can see that
the concern about self-dealing is justified even in the current environment.
To say that the pathological perspective ultimately justifies Fed independence,
however, is not to deny the value of an independent Fed in ordinary times. Here too we
can usefully analogize to an independent judiciary.
Various normative theories of judicial review extend to some but not all of the
domain of judicial enforcement of the Constitution. For example, Jesse Choper has
argued that judicial enforcement of the Constitution’s federalism and separation-ofpowers norms creates unnecessary friction with the political branches and that the courts
should therefore spend their precious capital on protecting individual rights, where
counter-majoritarianism finds its strongest justification.184 At the same time, however,
Choper does not maintain that the courts act illegitimately when they enforce federalism
and separation-of-powers norms. 185 Likewise, even as he built a theory that justified
judicial review to reinforce democracy and protect minority rights, Ely allowed that the
courts can also enforce textual provisions that do neither.186
In acknowledging that judicial review can be legitimately exercised across a
broader range of cases than those that fall within its core justification, both Choper and
Ely were recognizing a basic truth about law and institutions. Just as laws are necessarily
over- and under-inclusive with respect to their background justifications, 187 so an
institution may be designed with one purpose in mind, but peculiar features of that design
allow it to function well—or poorly—in other settings. Where the design feature is
is not the case, the president would have the motive to impose contractionary policies late in her term,
rather than earlier, so that (by hypothesis), her political opponents in Congress pay the political price.
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otherwise advantageous, we might borrow a term from architecture and call it a spandrel;
where the design feature proves disastrous for some unanticipated reason we might
borrow a term from literature and call it a Frankenstein’s monster.188
In our view, the fact that the Fed has been able to minimize the damage done by
insufficiently expansionary fiscal policy since the 2008 economic crisis through loose
monetary policy is a happy accident—a byproduct of Fed independence that has been
designed to serve a very different purpose. We recognize, however, that people who
worry that the Fed’s “degrading” of the currency means that runaway inflation is just
around the corner would regard the Fed’s use of its independence over the recent period
as a very unhappy accident.
If we shared the view of the economic austerians,189 we would worry that the
recent tendency of the Fed to keep interest rates low calls into question the wisdom of
continuing to allow the Fed to act independently. An austerian might still favor Fed
independence, however, if she thought that its benefits in pathological circumstances
outweighed the harms it inflicts when the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy is more
expansionary (and thus, to an austerion, dangerous) than the monetary policy favored by
political actors. That would be a complex predictive judgment, which could come out the
other way. Because we are not austerians, however, to us the calculus looks quite
different. The pathological perspective provides the “something extra” needed to justify
Fed independence. The happy accident that in normal times Fed independence currently
leads to better monetary policy than our era’s politics would otherwise appear to allow is
simply an added bonus.

C. An Insider/Outsider Role
In our view, the foregoing analysis suffices to justify Fed independence even in an
age when political actors favor tight monetary policy. Nonetheless, we would call
attention to one additional benefit of Fed independence that may be sufficiently
substantial as to count as a freestanding justification for Fed independence. Because of
the Fed’s status as a governmental entity that is not fully answerable to the political
branches, it can act as a credible purchaser of government debt. As we described in detail
in Part III, that is a useful function in ordinary times and a potentially economy-rescuing
function during a crisis.
As we have explained, in a liquidity crisis, a central bank serves the vital role of
lender of last resort. In a sovereign debt crisis, a distinctly national central bank serves
another function. Recent debt crises in Europe illustrate the point by negative example.
Most prominently Greece—but also other countries struggling to repay sovereign debt—
would have a ready solution if they had borrowed in their own currency: They could
simply increase the money supply, thereby devaluing the currency, and effectively
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reducing the value of the debt to levels that could be repaid. To be sure, such a course
carries its own rather serious risks, which partly explains why Greece has not (yet)
simply abandoned the euro or exited the European Union (EU), but the decision to retain
the euro and stay within the EU was undoubtedly influenced by other factors as well.
First and most obviously, because Greece borrowed in euros, a return to and
devaluation of the drachma would not by itself affect its debt level.190 A country with its
own currency and central bank has the advantage of borrowing in its own currency, but
once it has accumulated debt in another currency, switching to a national currency does
not automatically convert the debt. Thus “Grexit” 191 can only be accomplished by a
default (or a negotiated haircut) on debt owed in euros, with an attendant increased cost
of obtaining future credit.192
Second, restarting a national currency would entail substantial transition costs. As
soon as people learned of an impending currency shift, many of them would seek to
withdraw their euros from Greek financial institutions before their money was converted
into drachmas of uncertain and likely declining value. Bank runs would result. Indeed,
something very much like this happened in Greece in the summer of 2015 when a Grexit
began to be taken seriously as a possibility.193
And finally, it appears that Greece faced the possibility of political and national
security consequences if it abandoned the euro.194 Thus, the fact that no Grexit has (yet)
occurred hardly shows that Greece would not have been better off had it never abandoned
the drachma for the euro in the first place.
The Greek case illustrates the value of a national central bank when a country
desperately needs credit, but it does not show that the central bank must be independent.
On the contrary, one might think that it shows the value of a central bank that does the
bidding of the elected leaders of the government. From the Greek perspective, the
problem with the European Central Bank in the current era is that it is too independent of
the government of Greece.
It does not follow, however, that a central bank should be subject to direct
political control. For one thing, as we argued above, the pathological perspective
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warrants some degree of independence to address the structural risk of self-dealing.
Moreover, even in a sovereign debt crisis, independence is valuable.
Consider the debt-ceiling scenario we discussed in Part III. The immediate impact
of a Fed policy of buying technically illegal bonds would be to enable the government to
pay its bills and thus to avoid defaulting on its legal obligations; buying those bonds buys
time for the political actors to come to their senses.
But a Fed policy of buying such bonds would also have a second, arguably more
important, impact. It would calm financial markets. Seeing the Fed purchasing the new
bonds would reassure holders of existing (pre-crisis) bonds that their assets remain
valuable. The policy would thus prevent a massive sell-off of Treasuries that would
further raise the government’s cost of borrowing and might even threaten the status of the
dollar as a reserve currency.
Crucially, however, the Fed can only play this market-pacification role if the Fed
is seen as a credible, responsible actor. Independence greatly strengthens that perception.
Imagine how markets would react if a politically controlled central bank were to buy new
bonds in a debt-ceiling crisis. Seeing that the administration’s “own” central bank was
complicit in the issuance of debt-ceiling-violating bonds, markets would hardly be
reassured of the real value of those bonds. Precisely because the actual Fed is insulated
from political control, it can act as a credible counter-party to the government when the
government issues debt.
The point is easiest to see in a crisis, but it also holds true in ordinary times. As
we explained above, money itself has no inherent value; it derives its value from the fact
that everyone expects everyone else to treat it as valuable. 195 A central bank that acts
independently of the political branches of government can credibly signal to the public
that the money (whether in the form of currency or bonds) the government issues indeed
has value. A central bank that is—and is therefore perceived as—a mere tool of the
political branches of government can make no such commitment.
Finally, the Fed’s political independence is also essential to allow it to fulfill its
key function as the agency that adjusts monetary policy in response to the political
branches’ changes in fiscal policy. A common view among economists is that, in normal
times, the Fed should adjust monetary policy to offset the expansionary or contractionary
effects of fiscal policy. For example, when politicians decide that it is a good idea to
reduce annual deficits or to run surpluses and thus pay down some of the government’s
debt, the associated government spending cuts or tax increases acting on their own would
tend to shrink the economy. If the Fed has room to cut interest rates, however,196 it can
prevent the economy from contracting in response to the fiscal consolidation.
Crucially, if the Fed were not independent, it would be much more difficult to
coordinate monetary and fiscal policies, and to guarantee to all relevant decision makers
that the amount and timing of the offsetting policy changes will be carried out without
political interference. But if the Fed can credibly guarantee to wavering members of
Congress, who might otherwise worry that their votes for tax increases or spending cuts
could result in job losses, knowing that monetary policy will be used to offset those
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effects would make it easier to vote for fiscal contraction. Although there are plenty of
situations in which particular tax increases or spending cuts might be unwise, the Fed’s
ability to remove macroeconomic concerns from the conversation allows the political
branches to discuss fiscal policy matters on their own merits. If, for example, the country
were emerging from a severe recession in which the government had instituted fiscal
measures that were intended to be temporary, the Fed’s independence would ease the
transition back to normal operations, thus preventing otherwise unnecessary spending
programs from becoming encrusted.
Similarly, if the political branches were to determine that there should be a large
increase in spending (for example, a multi-year program to rebuild the nation’s
infrastructure), there might be serious concern that such an expansionary fiscal policy
could generate inflation. Knowing that the Fed would prevent that from happening would
again allow politicians to evaluate such a policy only on its merits or demerits.
In short, even the political branches have good reason to want the Fed not to be a
tool of those same political branches. Just as it is important to the health of the financial
system (and ultimately, therefore, to the overall economy) that the public not view the
Fed as being part of the political mix, it is important that the politicians themselves know
that their decisions on fiscal policy will be paired with appropriately non-politicized
monetary policy decisions. Only an independent Fed can credibly make such a guarantee.
Conclusion
In response to repeated market panics in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Congress created the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to serve as the nation’s
central bank. The Fed’s core function is to be the “lender of last resort,” to intervene
when market contagions create runs on banks and to counter other market pathologies
that could, if unchecked, threaten the viability of the entire financial system and thus the
economy. Because of the surpassing importance of that core function, Congress granted
the Fed substantial independence in setting policy and in implementing the market
interventions that it deems necessary. Being the lender of last resort, in turn, requires the
Fed either to set monetary policy after a crisis has passed (to offset its actions during the
crisis), or at least to coordinate with any other entity that Congress might endow with the
power to set monetary policy (including Congress itself). Congress wisely chose to give
the Fed that power directly.
The Fed’s performance during and after the 2008 market collapse was exemplary.
It was not only the Fed’s political independence that allowed it to succeed; in addition, its
functional and perceived position as being “outside the government” allowed the Fed to
calm the markets and rescue the economy from what could have become a second Great
Depression. The extent of the Fed’s actions in the 2008 crisis, and the inability of any
other public or private entity to intervene successfully in the crisis, made Congress’s
decisions in setting up the Fed as a powerful entity freed from day-to-day political
considerations look prescient.
Nonetheless, the Fed’s recent actions have led to vituperative attacks on its
independence. This is hardly the first time that the Fed or its predecessors have been
targeted, but the current round of attacks has included extreme calls to inject political
considerations into the Fed’s decision making and attempts to intimidate Fed decision
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makers to set aside their own best judgment in favor of the Fed’s attackers’ policy
preferences.
In this article, we have argued that the Fed should not be rendered more directly
accountable to political actors. The very real possibility of a near-future crisis that would
be caused by the political branches’ failure to increase the federal debt ceiling shows how
the Fed’s unique structure makes it the only actor that could minimize the damage in such
a crisis, both because of the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort and its power to act
exactly when needed. We also warn, however, that pushing the Fed into the role of lastminute savior in such a crisis risks exposing it to accusations that it has taken sides in a
political conflict. In proving that its political independence is essential, the Fed might
endanger that very independence.
Even if we are wrong about how that particular hypothetical crisis would play out,
our broader goal is to explain how the Fed’s political independence enables it to act,
during good times as well as bad, as an essential bulwark against policy making that
would harm the financial system and the economy as a whole. We note that the Fed’s
“insider-outsider” role provides the latitude for the Fed to take actions that would
safeguard financial markets, whereas any other agency of government that tried to engage
in those same actions would more likely fail (and possibly even make matters worse).
In addition, drawing an analogy to the Article III judiciary, we argue that
institutional independence is easiest to justify when it prevents the “ins” from abusing
power for political advantage. We thus show that the Fed’s independence protects the
public from politicians’ efforts to use the especially tempting levers of monetary policy to
entrench themselves in power. We further argue that the Fed’s independence allows
politicians to undertake policy initiatives with the knowledge that their actions will not be
undermined by politically motivated activity at the Fed. In both good times and bad,
therefore, an independent-but-ultimately-accountable Federal Reserve is an essential
guardian of both the economy and the political system.

61

